Nick: Welcome again to the Explaining Historypodcast. This is Part 2 of the podcast I did yesterday on Tito, Yugoslavia, and Stalin—the first post-war schism within the communist world.

Yesterday we looked at Russian chauvinism towards Yugoslavia. We discussed how Tito, despite being quite the Stalinist economically, was well aware of Stalin’s designs. Stalin discouraged rapid industrialization in Yugoslavia because he wanted it to remain an agricultural vassal state, supplying raw materials to the Soviet metropole. This is essentially how colonialism and neocolonialism are structured: you don’t want vassal states producing high-quality manufactured goods that lead to wealth accumulation.

Tito rejected this interference. Now, we are going to look at the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform.

Reading again from R.J. Crampton’s Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – And After:

“The assumption that Yugoslav comrades could be treated similarly to others in Eastern Europe became critical in the field of foreign affairs. Here Tito’s confidence that he could make his own policy caused real fears in the Kremlin that Yugoslav exuberance could provoke the West into anti-communist action precisely when Stalin needed tranquility and time to consolidate his authority.”

By 1947, Western intelligence agencies were becoming increasingly active in guerrilla operations in the Balkans. Stalin feared that if Tito wasn’t a faithful vassal, he could either be drawn into a Western sphere of influence or become a staging post for subversion within the communist bloc.

There was no doubting Tito’s audacity. His troops had occupied Trieste at the end of the war and refused to leave until Stalin ordered them out, fearing a Third WorldThird World Full Description: Originally a political term—not a measure of poverty—used to describe the nations unaligned with the capitalist “First World” or the communist “Second World.” It drew a parallel to the “Third Estate” of the French Revolution: the disregarded majority that sought to become something. The concept of the Third World was initially a project of hope and solidarity. It defined a bloc of nations in Latin America, Africa, and Asia that shared a common history of colonialism and a common goal of development. It was a rallying cry for the global majority to unite against imperialism and racial hierarchy. Critical Perspective:Over time, the term was stripped of its radical political meaning and reduced to a synonym for underdevelopment and destitution. This linguistic shift reflects a victory for Western narratives: instead of a rising political force challenging the global order, the “Third World” became framed as a helpless region requiring Western charity and intervention. War. In August 1946, Yugoslav forces shot down two US transport planes, forcing Tito to apologize and pay compensation. In Greece, the Yugoslavs continued to help communist forces despite Moscow’s disapproval.

Most alarmingly, the Kremlin disapproved of Tito’s talk of a “Balkan Federation.” Tito showed no signs of buckling. In May 1945, he made a speech in Ljubljana stating: “We do not want to be small change; we do not want to be involved in any spheres of influence.”

This was a declaration of non-alignment right at the end of the war. The Soviet ambassador in Belgrade saw this speech as an act of hostility. If Yugoslavia did not become part of a sphere of influence, it could become an independent factor in world affairs.

Given Tito’s insistence that the Yugoslav version of socialism was equally valid to the Soviet one, there was a danger that other East European leaders would find the Yugoslav model more attractive. Tito’s partisan war record made him a legend, and his visits to Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, and Budapest in 1946-47 looked like a triumphal tour. Stalin’s vanity could not tolerate this.

In July 1947, the Yugoslavs and Bulgarians concluded the Bled Agreement, referencing a federation. The Greek communists misinterpreted this as a signal for a more forward policy and launched an offensive. Stalin decided to overturn this by enticing Yugoslav policy into overdrive. He encouraged the absorption of Albania, only to then have Pravda condemn the Bulgarian leader Dimitrov for talking about a Balkan Federation.

Stalin then demanded an immediate federation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on terms Tito recognized as a “Trojan Horse” for Soviet control. When Tito refused to go to Moscow, sending Edvard Kardelj instead, Stalin raged. On March 18, 1948, Soviet advisors were withdrawn.

The assumption in Moscow was that Tito would collapse without Soviet approval. “I will shake my little finger, and there will be no more Tito,” Stalin remarked. But as Khrushchev later noted, Stalin could shake any part of his anatomy he liked; it made no difference to Tito.

Tito’s survival wasn’t guaranteed. In July, he called an extraordinary party conference, allowed an open debate, and published the correspondence with Moscow. He insisted his quarrel was with the Cominform, not the Soviet Union itself.

However, once the debate was aired, Tito took severe measures against “Cominformists”—those loyal to Moscow. General Arso Jovanović was shot while trying to flee to Romania. Thousands were interned in the fearsome Goli Otok concentration camp.

Because of Soviet intimidation, Tito did not relax his grip until the early 1950s. By then, Stalin had been humbled. More sinister was the fact that Stalin used the split to terrify Eastern Europe. The charge of “Titoism” became the new “Trotskyism”—a label used to cleanse parties of any potential threats to Stalin’s authority.

We will perhaps continue that story soon. Keep your eyes peeled for an announcement later this week about the masterclass we’re running for A-Level students after Christmas on how to answer exam questions about Stalin. Make sure you sign up if that’s what you’re studying!