In the mid-1960s, the United States was governed by what historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. called the “Vital Center”—a liberal consensus that believed in the New DealThe New Deal Full Description:A comprehensive series of programs, public work projects, financial reforms, and regulations enacted by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It represented a fundamental shift in the US government’s philosophy, moving from a passive observer to an active manager of the economy and social welfare. The New Deal was a response to the failure of the free market to self-correct. It created the modern welfare state through the “3 Rs”: Relief for the unemployed and poor, Recovery of the economy to normal levels, and Reform of the financial system to prevent a repeat depression. It introduced social security, labor rights, and massive infrastructure projects. Critical Perspective:From a critical historical standpoint, the New Deal was not a socialist revolution, but a project to save capitalism from itself. By providing a safety net and creating jobs, the state successfully defused the revolutionary potential of the starving working class. It acknowledged that capitalism could not survive without state intervention to mitigate its inherent brutality and instability.
Read more at home and the containment of communism abroad. Yet, by 1968, this center had collapsed, assailed not just by the conservative right, but by a ferocious “New Left” that viewed liberalism as morally bankrupt.

In this week’s podcast, I explored this pivotal moment using Kim McQuaid’s excellent book, The Anxious Years. The critique launched by the New Left was blistering: they argued that Cold War liberals were merely “wolves in sheep’s clothing,” terrified of being red-baited by the right and thus eager to prove their toughness through imperialist aggression.

The Trap of “Toughness”

The tragedy of the Democratic Party in this era was its fear of the shadow of McCarthyism. As McQuaid notes, figures like John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson felt trapped in an “escalatory duet” with the right. To pass domestic reforms, they had to prove their anti-communist bona fides.

This led to a perverse logic where liberals started wars to prevent conservatives from starting bigger ones. Kennedy’s adventures in Cuba and Vietnam were driven, in part, by a belief that if he didn’t act, the right would crucify him. As Gary Wills summarized: “The only way to become a peacemaker is first to disarm the warmakers by making a little successful war.” Of course, in Vietnam, the “little war” became a catastrophe.

The Credibility Gap

The turning point was 1968. The Tet Offensive shattered the illusion that the “best and brightest” in Washington knew what they were doing. When North Vietnamese commandos breached the US Embassy in Saigon, they didn’t just attack a building; they attacked the credibility of the entire foreign policy establishment.

For the New Left—groups like the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)—this confirmed what they had long suspected: the “experts” were frauds. They adopted C. Wright Mills’ term “The Power Elite” (or “The Establishment”) to describe an unelected oligarchy of bureaucrats, generals, and corporate leaders who ran the country regardless of election results. This critique of a “Deep State” long predates the modern populist right; it began as a scream of frustration from the radical left.

The Failure of the New Left

However, while the New Left succeeded in diagnosing the rot at the heart of American liberalism, they failed to offer a viable alternative. They could disrupt, protest, and expose, but they could not govern. As the war dragged on and the backlash mounted, the movement fractured into sectarianism and violence, eventually clearing the path for the conservative counter-revolution of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.

Understanding this era is crucial because it reveals the fragility of the “center.” When the political establishment prioritizes maintaining its own status over telling the truth to the public, it doesn’t just lose elections; it loses its legitimacy.

The A-Level History Masterclass Series: January – June 2025

• Jan 25: The Russian Revolution & Stalinism
• Feb 8: Nazi Germany
• Feb 22: Post-War America (1945-1974)

Stop Memorising. Start Arguing.

Most students lose marks not because they lack knowledge, but because they lack structure. They treat the exam like a memory test, not an argument.

In this live series, we are skipping the basics. We are focusing entirely on the high-level skills that separate a Grade B from a Grade A*:

• Essay Architecture: The exact paragraph structures that force examiners to give top marks.
• Applied Historiography: How to use academic debate to strengthen your argument, not just fill space.
• Deep Context: The nuance and detail that textbooks leave out.

This is the system for turning historical knowledge into exam results.

Booking Opens: First Week of January.