History rarely moves in straight lines; it moves in jumps, breaks, and inflection points. Looking back at the 20th century, years like 1933, 1968, and 1989 stand out as moments where long-developing trends coalesced into irreversible change.

I believe 2025 is one of those years.

Specifically for Europe, this year marks the closure of a period that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The “End of History”—that Fukuyama-esque sense that liberal democracy and European integration were inevitable and secure—has shattered. Here is why Europe finds itself in its most vulnerable position since 1945.

The Collapse of the Security Umbrella

For decades, Europe underspent on defense, relying on the assumption that the United States would always be there. Whether through the lens of Trumpism or simply the entropy of international relations, that guarantee is gone. The war in Ukraine woke Europe up, but the realization has come too late. With an isolationist America viewing the EU as a market competitor rather than a strategic partner, Europe is militarily exposed and politically fragmented.

The Centrist Trap and the Far Right

From Meloni in Italy to the AfD in Germany and the looming threat of Le Pen in France, the far-right is no longer at the gates—they are inside the building. Centrist leaders like Macron and Starmer have attempted to triangulate by adopting far-right rhetoric on culture wars and migration. This strategy has backfired spectacularly. Instead of drawing support away, it legitimizes the extremists. Voters, as they say, prefer the “real deal” over the imitation.

The Demographic Reality Check

The most biting irony of 2025 is the clash between political ideology and biological reality. Europe’s replacement rate has stalled (around 1.1 in some areas). An aging continent needs workers for healthcare, transport, and services. Mathematically, mass migration is the only solution to economic collapse, yet it is the very thing the rising political powers seek to violently suppress. It is a death instinct playing out in real-time.

De-industrialization and the China Dilemma

Germany, the engine of Europe, is sputtering. The end of cheap Russian gas and the mysterious destruction of Nord Stream have accelerated de-industrialization. The German auto industry’s potential lifeline—partnerships with Chinese EV manufacturers—is being severed by US pressure to lock China out of the West.

Europe is caught between a rock and a hard place: unable to defend itself, losing its industrial base, and politically fracturing. If 1989 was the dawn of a new Europe, 2025 may well be the twilight.

Transcript

Nick: Welcome again to the Explaining History podcast.

This is the second review of the year that I’m doing. The last one was all about Trump’s America. The reason why I’m focusing on 2025 is that—and I may be proven wrong about this in years to come—I think 2025 is a historical inflection point.

If you look back on the 20th century, you see years like 1933, 1968, 1971 with Nixon removing the dollar from the gold standardGold Standard Full Description:The Gold Standard was the prevailing international financial architecture prior to the crisis. It required nations to hold gold reserves equivalent to the currency in circulation. While intended to provide stability and trust in trade, it acted as a “golden fetter” during the downturn. Critical Perspective:By tying the hands of policymakers, the Gold Standard turned a recession into a depression. It forced governments to implement austerity measures—cutting spending and raising interest rates—to protect their gold reserves, rather than helping the unemployed. It prioritized the assets of the wealthy creditors over the livelihoods of the working class, transmitting economic shockwaves globally as nations simultaneously contracted their money supplies., and 1989. There are points where trends that have been developing for a long time coalesce and bring about fundamental, irreversible change. That’s what I’m talking about. In 2025, there have been several of those.

I’m not talking about America today; I’m going to talk about Europe. The year that the European Union has had closes a period that likely lasted from 1989. If you imagine the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Velvet Revolutions across Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, there has been a “post-historical” sense—a Fukuyama-type “End of History” era. Obviously, you had the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, but they were contained; they didn’t destabilize the European Union in any meaningful way.

Europe’s “holiday from history” ends in 2025. Europe has been faced with a number of crises this year that have been gestating for a long time. Some of this is due to the weakening the EU experienced as a result of Brexit. While Europe marginalized the British quickly, the diminishment of both Britain and the EU was considerable.

However, this is about something else. This is about how Europe has developed since the end of the Second World War under America’s security umbrella, and why Europe now finds itself immensely vulnerable and oddly de-industrialized in an era where manufacturing matters more than anything else.

Of course, the rise of the far-right is relevant. In many cases, governments have co-opted far-right movements—look at Hungary, or Meloni’s Italy. There are other movements at the edge of power, like the Rassemblement National in France. Across Europe, you have centrist governments, like Macron’s, performing this almost suicidal act of toying with far-right politics. They talk the language of culture wars to draw support away from the far-right. But, as Keir Starmer has found in Great Britain, all it does is legitimize far-right talking points. People then go for the real deal; they go for the far-right speaker who actually has charisma. The regularity with which centrist governments do this suggests it is not a mistake.

The far-right in Europe is encouraged by the presence of Trump in America, who looks to destroy the European Union not out of principle, but because the EU represents a wall built around lucrative markets. Trump feeds a diatribe of half-truths about how America built Europe after the war, only for Europeans to “do over” America with cheap imports.

There are huge flows of money and data from shadowy oligarchs in America to far-right parties in Europe, often groomed by figures like Steve Bannon with the goal of breaking up Europe. The idea seems to be to lock China out of the game. China is the one power where I see serious potential for a magnification of Europe. If you look at the collapse of the German car industry, the one obvious thing that would revive it is an arrangement with Chinese EV manufacturers—joint ventures with BMW and Audi. But shutting China out of Europe is a key strategic objective of the United States.

Europe is significantly weakened, though it remains a continent of wealthy societies. However, the Trumpist rhetoric around immigration creates a dilemma. Europe’s replacement rate—the number of babies being born—has stalled, down to around 1.1 in some places. You need a lot of children to grow up and pay for retirees. There is a demographic crisis.

Europe has rising far-right parties who look to violently suppress mass immigration, but doing so will essentially lead to the extinction of European societies due to basic demographics. Erich Fromm talked about how fascism is evidence of a nihilistic “death instinct”—when people realize on a deep level that their way of life is up, they engage in actions that accelerate the very thing they profess to want to avoid.

The return of history means the end of the free ride on defense. Even without Trump, international relations theory tells us that alliances eventually crumble. In 10 or 20 years, a Democrat president would likely have said, “We can’t pay your defense bills any longer.” Trump simply feeds on resentment towards a Europe he sees as weak.

The war in Ukraine woke Europe up to its defense obligations. Yet, for the last few years, there has still been reliance on America, despite Britain, Germany, and France contributing significantly to the Ukrainian cause.

Germany, largely as a result of the end of cheap Russian fuel and the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline, has gone through a period of accelerated de-industrialization unprecedented in its post-war history. This has energized the AfD, who blame Germany’s problems on mass migration. In fact, mass migration is keeping Germany from falling off a workforce cliff. Imagine if the extremists got their way: who would work in care homes, hospitals, hotels, and transport? You are talking about losing a quarter to a third of the entire workforce.

France is also under constitutional crisis. Macron’s centrist triangulation—marginalizing the left while relying on them to bail him out against the far-right—is a shaky project. A Marine Le Pen government looks more and more likely.

Trump and his inner circle view Hungary as the model—an “ethnostate.” The reason Hungary or Poland are relatively homogeneous is due to the mass flows of refugees and expulsions at the end of WWII. Poland is currently enjoying an economic renaissance largely due to EU membership, despite far-right fantasies suggesting otherwise.

The EU presents itself as a geopolitical bloc but is unable to act like one. It is militarily dependent on the US. Only recently have German politicians realized the security umbrella is gone. Europe is politically fragmented, with bad actors like Orban undermining it from within, and democratic breakdowns elsewhere.

We see incompetence in figures like Kaja Kallas, the EU Foreign Policy Chief, whose inability to meaningfully articulate Europe’s positions leaves a perception of weakness. She essentially signaled that Europe would remain humble servants to the US, which only encourages further exploitation.

The EU was a project born of the crises of the Second World War—to contain communism, suppress fascism, and facilitate economic recovery. It did that very well. But we now exist in a time of climate crisis, insurgent technologies, a revanchist Russia, an isolationist America, and a Europe that doesn’t seem to have the capacity to respond.

In 2026, there is talk of Europe experiencing a “Century of Humiliation.” We can only look carefully to see which way European leaders jump—whether they hope to weather out Trump or realize that a return to the liberal democratic world of the past is a very distant possibility.

Thanks very much. I’ll do my next review of the year on Asia later in the week. Take care.