Introduction: The General at the Tomb

On July 25, 1920, French troops led by General Henri Gouraud entered Damascus. They had just routed the Arab forces at the Battle of Maysalun, ending the short-lived dream of an independent Arab Kingdom in Syria. According to a persistent, though historically debated, anecdote, one of Gouraud’s first acts upon entering the city was to visit the tomb of Saladin, the legendary sultan who had expelled the Crusaders from Jerusalem in the 12th century. Standing before the sepulcher, the French High Commissioner is said to have declared, “Saladin, we have returned.”

Whether the event happened exactly as described or is a piece of nationalist folklore, the symbolism captures the perceived character of the French MandateFrench Mandate The League of Nations mandate over Syria and Lebanon administered by France from 1920 to 1946. The Mandate created the modern borders of Syria and Lebanon, pursued a policy of divide and rule along religious and ethnic lines, and produced the political and institutional structures that shaped Syrian and Lebanese politics for the rest of the century. France had claimed a sphere of influence in Greater Syria — covering modern Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel-Palestine — since the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. When Faisal I attempted to establish an independent Arab kingdom with Damascus as its capital, French forces defeated him at the Battle of Maysalun in July 1920 and established the Mandate. The French administration divided the territory into five separate entities — State of Damascus, State of Aleppo, Alawite State, Jabal Druze, and Greater Lebanon — pursuing the classic colonial strategy of empowering minorities against the Sunni Arab majority that dominated the nationalist movement. The most consequential decision was the recruitment policy for the troupes spéciales: France disproportionately recruited Alawites, Druze, and Circassians into its auxiliary forces, creating a military tradition and institutional pathway that would allow Alawite officers to dominate Syria’s Ba’athist military after independence. The Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–27 demonstrated the capacity for mass anti-colonial mobilisation; the French response — bombarding Damascus and dividing the nationalist movement through negotiation with compliant sectors — foreshadowed the tactics that successive Syrian governments would use against their own populations. Lebanon was permanently separated from Syria, enlarged to include Muslim-majority coastal regions and the Bekaa Valley that Syrian nationalists regarded as historically theirs — creating the Lebanese demographic balance that would generate civil war in 1975. The French Mandate’s legacy is visible in virtually every Lebanese and Syrian political crisis of the subsequent century. The Lebanese sectarian system — its power-sharing arrangements, its politically organised communities, its structural inability to build a nonsectarian state — was not simply the product of ancient religious divisions but of administrative choices made by French officials trying to manage a diverse population in the interests of imperial order. The Alawite domination of Syrian security services that produced both Hafez al-Assad’s dictatorship and the particular ferocity of the civil war was not inevitable; it was the downstream consequence of French recruitment policies designed to prevent a unified Sunni nationalist challenge to colonial rule. Colonialism does not end when the troops leave; it ends, if it ends, when its institutional consequences have been unwound — a process that, in Syria and Lebanon, remains unfinished. in the Levant. Unlike the British, whose imperial ventures in the Middle East were largely driven by strategic considerations such as trade routes and oil, the French enterprise was deeply influenced by history and ideology. France viewed itself as the heir to the Latin Kingdoms of the Crusades and the designated protector of the Eastern Christians, particularly the Maronites of Mount Lebanon.

While the British spent the early 1920s amalgamating distinct Ottoman provinces to create the unitary state of Iraq, the French pursued a strategy of fragmentation in Syria. Guided by the colonial maxim of diviser pour régner (divide and ruleDivide and Rule Full Description:A colonial strategy of governance aimed at maintaining power by creating or exploiting divisions among subject populations. In India, this involved institutionalizing religious differences in the census, electorates, and army recruitment to prevent a unified anti-colonial front. Divide and Rule describes the British policy of playing different communities against one another. By introducing separate electorates (where Muslims voted only for Muslims and Hindus for Hindus), the colonial state ensured that politicians had to appeal to narrow religious identities rather than broad national interests. Critical Perspective:This policy did not merely exploit existing tensions; it manufactured them. Before British rule, identities were fluid and overlapping. The colonial state’s obsession with categorization “froze” these identities into rigid, antagonistic blocs. Partition can be seen as the logical endpoint of this administrative strategy—the ultimate success of a policy designed to make unity impossible.
Read more), French administrators partitioned the unified Ottoman province of Syria into several administrative units based largely on sectarian identity. This policy included the creation of a state for the Alawites, a state for the Druze, and, most consequentially, the expansion of the Maronite enclave into “Greater Lebanon.”

This article examines the French fabrication of Grand Liban in 1920. It analyzes the strategic rationale behind expanding the traditional Maronite territory to include large Sunni and Shia populations, a decision that fundamentally altered the demographics of the Levant. It explores how the French policy of administrative fragmentation institutionalized religious identity as a primary basis for politics, influencing the trajectory of both Lebanon and Syria for decades to come.

The Battle of Maysalun: The End of the Arab Kingdom

To understand the French reorganization of the Levant, one must first appreciate the political entity it replaced. Between October 1918 and July 1920, Damascus was the capital of the Arab Kingdom of Syria, ruled by Faisal bin Hussein, the son of the Sharif of Mecca.

Faisal’s government was the first modern attempt at Arab self-rule in the region. It was constitutional and pan-Arab, claiming authority over the entirety of “Greater Syria” (which included modern Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan). However, the San Remo Conference of April 1920 assigned the mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France.

General Henri Gouraud, a decorated war hero of the Western Front appointed as High Commissioner, viewed Faisal’s government as an obstacle to French mandate rights. In July 1920, Gouraud issued an ultimatum demanding that Faisal disband the Arab army and accept French authority.

When the ultimatum was not fully met, Gouraud ordered the advance. On July 24, 1920, at the pass of Maysalun, a disparate force of Arab regulars and volunteers commanded by Yusuf al-Azma confronted the modern French Army of the Levant. The French, utilizing tanks, aircraft, and colonial troops, achieved a decisive victory. Yusuf al-Azma was killed in the fighting, becoming a symbol of resistance.

The victory at Maysalun allowed France to expel Faisal (who would later become King of Iraq) and establish direct control over the Syrian interior. With the unitary Arab state dismantled, Gouraud initiated the reorganization of the territory.

The Logic of Partition: A Mosaic of States

French colonial strategy was influenced by the view that the Levant was not a cohesive nation, but a “mosaic” of distinct religious and ethnic minorities. The French administration presented itself as the protector of these minorities against potential domination by the Sunni Muslim majority.

To secure their rule, French officials sought to fragment the region into smaller political units. Between 1920 and 1922, Gouraud issued decrees that partitioned the mandate into several distinct states, each with its own administration:

1. The State of Damascus: A Sunni-majority state, stripped of its traditional access to the coast.
2. The State of Aleppo: Another Sunni-majority state in the north. The separation of Aleppo from Damascus was intended to prevent the formation of a unified nationalist bloc.
3. The Alawite State: Located on the coast around Latakia and Tartus, this state was created for the Alawite sect. The French actively recruited Alawites into the Troupes Spéciales du Levant (the indigenous colonial army), fostering a distinct Alawite identity within the military structure.
4. The Jabal Druze State: Located in the volcanic mountains of the south, this state was created for the Druze community.
5. The Sanjak of Alexandretta: A special administrative zone in the north with a large Turkish population (this territory would eventually be ceded to Turkey in 1939).

This administrative structure was designed to ensure that the mandate authorities remained the central arbiter of regional politics.

The Invention of Greater Lebanon

The most significant act of French cartography was the creation of Greater Lebanon (Le Grand Liban). This decision was driven by France’s historic relationship with the Maronite Catholic Church and the lobbying of Maronite leaders.

Since the mid-19th century, the Maronites had enjoyed autonomy in the Mount Lebanon range under the Ottoman Mutasarrifate system. This area was overwhelmingly Christian and Druze but was geographically small and lacked major ports and fertile agricultural land. The Great Famine of 1915–1918 had highlighted this vulnerability.

Maronite Patriarch Elias Peter Hoayek lobbied the French government for an independent Lebanese state with expanded borders to ensure its economic viability. General Gouraud agreed. On September 1, 1920, Gouraud proclaimed the creation of the State of Greater Lebanon.

To form this new entity, France annexed distinct regions from the Syrian interior and coast to the original Mount Lebanon:

1. Beirut: The commercial capital with a mixed population of Sunni Muslims and Christians.
2. Tripoli: A predominantly Sunni port city in the north.
3. The Bekaa Valley: A fertile agricultural region to the east with significant Shia and Christian populations.
4. The South (Jabal Amil): A predominantly Shia region.

The Demographic Shift and the Confessional System

The creation of Greater Lebanon fundamentally altered the demographic balance of the state. In the old Mutasarrifate, Christians had comprised a clear majority (roughly 80%). In the new “Greater Lebanon,” the annexation of the coastal cities and the Bekaa Valley reduced the Christian majority to approximately 55%, bringing in large Sunni and Shia populations.

Many Sunnis in the newly incorporated areas, particularly in Tripoli, resented the separation from Syria and initially refused to recognize the state’s legitimacy. To manage this diversity, the French administration helped construct a political framework based on Confessionalism.

This system distributed political power and administrative positions based on religious identity rather than simple majority rule. Although formally solidified in the National Pact of 1943 upon independence, the roots of this arrangement lay in the mandate era. The system eventually dictated that the President would be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia Muslim.

While this arrangement allowed for power-sharing, it also institutionalized sectarian identity as the primary vehicle for political engagement.

The Revolt of 1925: The Challenge to Division

The policy of fragmentation faced a significant challenge in 1925 with the outbreak of the Great Syrian RevoltGreat Syrian Revolt The large-scale anti-colonial uprising against French Mandate rule in Syria from 1925 to 1927, which began among the Druze of Jabal Druze and spread to Damascus and other major cities. It was the most significant anti-colonial revolt in the interwar Arab world. The revolt began in July 1925 when the Druze community of Jabal Druze, led by Sultan al-Atrash, rose against French administrative policies that violated the autonomy they had been promised. French forces were defeated in several early engagements, and the revolt spread rapidly to the Damascus region, the Hauran plain, and to sections of the city of Damascus itself, drawing in Arab nationalists who saw an opportunity to challenge French rule more broadly. The French response was decisive and brutal: Damascus was bombarded twice — in October 1925 and again in May 1926 — destroying significant parts of the old city and killing hundreds of civilians. The combination of military pressure, aerial bombardment, and political negotiation (including promises of a consultative council) broke the revolt by 1927, though Sultan al-Atrash and other leaders went into exile rather than submit. The revolt demonstrated several things that would prove significant: the capacity for cross-sectarian alliance between Druze, Sunnis, and some Christians in opposition to colonial rule; the willingness of France to use overwhelming force including civilian bombardment to maintain its authority; and the limits of military resistance without external support or a unified political leadership. The Great Syrian Revolt is sometimes described as a failure because it did not achieve independence. This framing misses its significance. It established the political geography of Syrian nationalism — demonstrating that resistance to colonial rule was possible, that cross-sectarian coalitions could form around national rather than communal identity, and that France’s authority was not accepted. It also established the French approach to governing Syria: a combination of military force sufficient to suppress direct challenge and political manipulation of communal divisions sufficient to prevent unified nationalist challenge. These techniques — bombardment of civilian populations, political co-optation of compliant communal leaders, maintenance of emergency powers — would be adopted, with variations, by the Ba’athist governments that claimed to inherit Syrian nationalism while suppressing it.. The uprising began in the Jabal Druze State, led by Sultan al-Atrash, in response to the policies of the French governor.

What started as a local rebellion spread to other regions, including Damascus, bridging some of the sectarian divides the French had sought to maintain. Druze fighters coordinated with Sunni nationalists, posing a serious threat to French control.

France responded with military force. In October 1925, French forces bombarded Damascus to dislodge rebels from the old city, resulting in significant civilian casualties and damage to the historic quarter. The revolt was suppressed by 1927, but it prompted a reassessment of French policy. In the 1930s, the states of Aleppo and Damascus were nominally reunited into the “Syrian Republic,” and the Alawite and Druze territories were eventually reincorporated. However, the separation of Lebanon remained a cornerstone of French policy.

The Legacy of the Mandate

The French Mandate ended in 1946, but the borders and structures established in the 1920s continued to shape the region.

Lebanon’s Political Trajectory

The demographic balance engineered in 1920 proved unstable over time. As demographic shifts occurred, the rigid power-sharing formulas established under the mandate became a source of tension. While the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) had complex causes involving regional conflicts and Palestinian refugees, the structural rigidities of the confessional system contributed to the breakdown of the state.

The Syrian Military

In Syria, the French policy of recruiting minorities, particularly Alawites, into the Troupes Spéciales had long-term implications. This provided social mobility for the Alawite community and led to their overrepresentation in the officer corps of the independent Syrian army. This dynamic facilitated the eventual rise of the Alawite-dominated Ba’athist regime under Hafez al-Assad in 1970.

Conclusion: The Imperial Map

The creation of Greater Lebanon and the partition of Syria illustrate how imperial decisions, driven by a mix of ideology and strategy, defined the modern political geography of the Levant. While the British in Iraq amalgamated diverse provinces, the French in Syria fragmented a unified region.

General Gouraud’s decision to expand the borders of Lebanon created a state that was economically viable but politically fragile. By institutionalizing sectarian identity as the basis for administration, the mandate period ensured that religion would remain a central fault line in the politics of the region. The modern history of the Levant is, in many ways, the story of the peoples of the region navigating the structures built by the French administration in the 1920s.