The UN’s inaugural session convened on 10 January 1946 in a war-scarred London, only months after the UN Charter took effect in October 1945.  In a symbolic choice, the Assembly met in Westminster’s Methodist Central Hall – a building still bearing shrapnel scars from the Blitz – to underscore Allied unity and a commitment to peace.  A bronze plaque in Westminster Hall still commemorates this moment.  As one contemporary reported, “the first meeting of the General Assembly… was held in London” .  Delegates from 51 nations (including five Soviet and British dominion states) poured into Westminster Central Hall for this historic gathering .  The site itself – once a church sanctuary, now a grand auditorium – was carpeted in red, with a vast pipe organ at the front and two balconies rising on either side.  (The Great Hall today still looks much the same.)  Prime Minister Clement Attlee, standing before the flags of the Allies, greeted the Assembly on behalf of the host nation.  Attlee urged delegates to bring “the same sense of urgency, the same self-sacrifice and the same willingness to subordinate sectional interests” to peace that they had shown in war .  In tone and setting, observers already noted a stark break from the 1920s League of NationsLeague of Nations Full Description:The first worldwide intergovernmental organisation whose principal mission was to maintain world peace. Its spectacular failure to prevent the aggression of the Axis powers provided the negative blueprint for the United Nations, influencing the decision to prioritize enforcement power over pure idealism. The League of Nations was the precursor to the UN, established after the First World War. Founded on the principle of collective security, it relied on moral persuasion and unanimous voting. It ultimately collapsed because it lacked an armed force and, crucially, the United States never joined, rendering it toothless in the face of expansionist empires. Critical Perspective:The shadow of the League looms over the UN. The founders of the UN viewed the League as “too democratic” and ineffective because it treated all nations as relatively equal. Consequently, the UN was designed specifically to correct this “error” by empowering the Great Powers (via the Security Council) to police the world, effectively sacrificing sovereign equality for the sake of stability.
Read more: instead of neutral Geneva, this was “grim” London, with soldiers patrolling the perimeter .

Opening the First General Assembly

At 10 January 1946, Secretary-General-designate Gladwyn Jebb called the meeting to order, and Belgium’s Paul-Henri Spaak was elected as the first President of the General Assembly.  In a contest that highlighted emerging East-West rivalries, Spaak (a pro-British socialist) won by 28 votes to 23 over the Soviet-backed candidate, Norway’s Trygve Lie .  (Notably, the United States voted for Lie alongside the USSR , reflecting early diplomatic bargaining.)  Delegates described the balloting as “with little less dignity than at a political convention,” but the outcome was decisive: Spaak became the first UNGA President.  The Assembly’s agenda that week was largely organizational: electing vice-presidents, committees, and non-permanent members of the Security CouncilSecurity Council Full Description:The Security Council is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions and authorize military force. While the General Assembly includes all nations, real power is concentrated here. The council is dominated by the “Permanent Five” (P5), reflecting the military victors of the last major global conflict rather than current geopolitical realities or democratic representation. Critical Perspective:Critics argue the Security Council renders the UN undemocratic by design. It creates a two-tiered system of sovereignty: the Permanent Five are effectively above the law, able to shield themselves and their allies from scrutiny, while the rest of the world is subject to the Council’s enforcement. and Economic and Social Council .  Even so, the opening speeches set a lofty tone.  Attlee, for example, emphasized economic causes of war and the need for international cooperation rather than the older League themes of disarmament morality .  President Harry Truman, speaking back in Washington (since the U.S. delegation in London included Secretary of State Stettinius but no President), sent a message to Congress noting that “the first meeting of the General Assembly… now in progress in London marks the real beginning of our bold adventure toward the preservation of peace” .  Truman underlined the American vision that the UN must promote justice: “If peace is to endure it must rest upon justice no less than upon power,” he said, insisting that smaller nations have a voice alongside great powers .

Even in this initial week, fissures were apparent.  One British newspaper noted that “in this grim capital… it was two young and powerful nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, that held the stage, one by its speech and the other by its silence” .  The Assembly chamber included a handful of “Geneva faces” – veterans of the old League, like Viscount Cecil of Britain and China’s Wellington Koo – but many familiar League delegates were absent.  Even Switzerland stayed away.  (The neutrals had not been invited to this first session, and as one observer explained, they refused to join an organization whose Council might compel them to abandon neutrality .)  The working methods, however, followed the Charter.  Over the next days the Assembly elected not only Spaak’s four vice-presidents, but also 12 non-permanent Security Council members and 13 of 18 Economic-and-Social-Council members .  In parallel, under the Charter provisions, delegates also began implementing the UN’s other organs: they held elections (in conjunction with the Security Council) for the judges of the new International Court of Justice, and filled the seats of the Trusteeship CouncilTrusteeship Council Short Description (Excerpt):One of the principal organs of the UN, established to supervise the administration of “Trust Territories”—mostly former colonies of defeated nations. Its theoretical goal was to prepare these territories for self-government or independence. Full Description:The Trusteeship Council was the successor to the League of Nations mandate system. It oversaw the transition of territories from colonial rule to independence. The Council suspended its operations in the late 20th century after the last trust territory (Palau) achieved independence. Critical Perspective:Critically, this system was a form of “sanctified colonialism.” It operated on the paternalistic assumption that certain peoples were not yet “ready” for freedom and required the “tutelage” of advanced Western nations. While it eventually facilitated independence, it ensured that the process happened on a timeline and under terms dictated by the colonial powers, often preserving their economic interests in the newly independent states.
Read more (which would oversee decolonization) .

The First Security Council

Exactly one week after the GA’s debut, on 17 January 1946, the Security Council met for the first time at Church House, Westminster .  (Under the Charter, its five permanent members – US, USSR, UK, China, France – convened with seven newly elected non-permanents.)  This session focused on organization and procedure: it adopted formal rules for debate and voting , while also taking up its first real international disputes.  Within days the Council was deluged with crises.  In late January 1946, Iran complained that Soviet troops were still occupying its northern provinces.  On 25 January, the Council heard letters from Iran and the USSR, and after debate it decided (unanimously) simply to “request the parties to inform the Council of any results achieved in such negotiations” over their dispute .  In practice this meant urging Tehran and Moscow to report back as they negotiated a pullout.  The wording (from a British-drafted resolution) was cautious: it affirmed that both sides had agreed to seek a negotiated solution, and it retained the right to re-open the case later .  The Soviets had not succeeded in blocking even this minimal step onto the Council’s agenda .

Meanwhile, another hot issue – the Greek Civil War – was swiftly brought before the Council by the USSR.  On 21 January 1946, the Soviet government formally invoked Article 35 of the Charter to accuse Britain of fuelling conflict in Greece.  Vyshinsky’s letter charged that “the presence of United Kingdom troops in Greece… [was] causing extreme tension” and requested the Council to intervene .  By 28 January (the Council’s third meeting) this “Greek question” was added to the agenda.  Over the next week (1–6 February) the Council took statements but declined any strong action.  In a vote on 4 Feb, a U.S.-backed proposal (put forward by Poland) to simply “take note of the statements” and accept Britain’s assurance to withdraw its forces was actually defeated due to Soviet opposition .  (At that meeting, only 2 of 11 members voted in favor of closing the issue, reflecting divided loyalties.)  In the end the Council adopted only a bland formula: it “took note” of British and Soviet statements and considered the matter closed for the moment .

Another early flashpoint would soon involve Spain.  Encouraged by the Soviet bloc (and in part by Poland’s initiative), the Council took up the “Spanish question” of whether to ostracize Franco’s regime.  On 29 April 1946, by unanimous vote the Security Council passed Resolution 4, which “noted its unanimous moral condemnation of the Franco regime” and set up a subcommittee to study Spain’s status .  (A full sanctions resolution would come later in 1947, but even in 1946 the initial condemnation passed unanimously – a rare point of agreement.)

Perhaps the single most ominous Cold War sign, however, was the first use of the veto.  In February 1946, the issue on the table was the “Syrian and Lebanese question” – a dispute over Anglo-French troops in the Levant.  In the Council meetings of 14–16 February, the Soviets sided firmly with Syria and Lebanon and cast the UN’s very first veto.  As one historian notes, “It was then that the veto was used for the first time, by the USSR, in supporting the case… for the withdrawal of British and French troops” .  This act demonstrated that Moscow was prepared to block Council action as needed – a power its Western rivals also possessed from Day One under the Charter.  (Indeed, Truman had promised Congress that the U.S. would support the UN “charter of collaborationCollaboration Full Description:The cooperation of local governments, police forces, and citizens in German-occupied countries with the Nazi regime. The Holocaust was a continental crime, reliant on French police, Dutch civil servants, and Ukrainian militias to identify and deport victims. Collaboration challenges the narrative that the Holocaust was solely a German crime. across Europe, local administrations assisted the Nazis for various reasons: ideological agreement (antisemitism), political opportunism, or bureaucratic obedience. In many cases, local police rounded up Jews before German forces even arrived. Critical Perspective:This term reveals the fragility of social solidarity. When their Jewish neighbors were targeted, many European societies chose to protect their own national sovereignty or administrative autonomy by sacrificing the minority. It complicates the post-war myths of “national resistance” that many European countries adopted to hide their complicity.
Read more” but reserved the right to use veto to protect its own security interests .)

Early Agenda and Key Initiatives

Beyond immediate crises, the London meetings also launched several major UN initiatives.  On 24 January 1946, the very first resolution of the General Assembly established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.  The GA called for all nations to cooperate in controlling atomic energy and eliminating weapons – a reflection of acute postwar anxieties about nuclear arms .  A US-drafted resolution created a ten-member commission (chaired by U.S. Deputy Secretary Acheson) to draft proposals for international control of the atom.  Similarly, delegates began translating President Roosevelt’s human-rights vision into permanent form.  In the months after London, the UN set up its Commission on Human Rights (with Eleanor Roosevelt as chair), laying the groundwork for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights .

By the Charter’s timetable, the London GA also turned to long-term institution-building.  It elected the judges of the newly established International Court of Justice (in coordination with the Security Council) and filled seats on the Trusteeship Council .  These steps put the League’s old World Court and the new trusteeship system (for former mandates and colonies) on track.  In short, the London session saw the UN moving from constitution-writing to action: setting agendas, staffing organs, and issuing resolutions.  As one press report forecast, after the speeches “tomorrow… the Assembly will get down to routine work of electing… non-permanent members of the SC and [ECOSOC]…” .

Key outcomes of the London meetings included:

UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) – Created by GA resolution on 24 January 1946 for supervising peaceful nuclear development . Commission on Human Rights – Established under ECOSOC in 1946, it met in 1947 to draft what became the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . International Court of Justice – GA (with Security Council) elected the first ICJ judges, instituting the world court envisioned in the Charter . Trusteeship Council – Delegates set up the bodies to oversee decolonization as outlined in Chapter XII of the Charter .

After London, the UN would meet in New York later in 1946, but many of these foundational tasks had already been set in motion by January.  The British press noted that this session’s work – from atomic energy to human rights – reflected “economic causes of war” and broader social issues, not just old disarmament debates .  In this sense, the Assembly’s agenda showed an early commitment to linking peace with justice and development, even as power politics simmered.

Emerging Cold War Faultlines

Even as the UN took on lofty missions, Cold War faultlines were apparent from the start.  The big powers already behaved like rivals rather than partners.  The Soviet absence of Foreign Minister Molotov and (initially) its chief delegate, Andrei Gromyko, in London hinted at Moscow’s caution.  When Gromyko did arrive (reportedly flying in after dealing with Finnish leadership in Helsinki ), his mere presence shifted the tone of Security Council debates.  In the General Assembly, too, delegates sensed a new bipolarity.  As noted earlier, one observer saw the scene as two superpowers commanding attention in different ways .  The U.S. delegation was energetic, advocating procedural fairness and global justice, whereas the USSR delegation was more circumspect and blocking.

This dynamic fit the analysis of later historians.  John Lewis Gaddis and others emphasize that from its birth the UN was “cast… in the light of US–Soviet rivalry” (the “grim capital” comment captures this).  Realist scholars like Melvyn Leffler point out that states joined the UN to pursue security and influence, not just idealism, and London’s debates bore that out.  The USSR’s tactics – pushing Lie for GA President, vetoing Council actions, dictating which issues to raise – reflect a calculated strategy of “security at the cost of activism” as one study puts it.  Gareth Roberts notes that Soviet leaders saw the UN as a venue to safeguard their border zones and political blocs; for example, their maneuvers over Poland’s borders and influence (a background factor in Spaak’s election) showed Moscow’s priorities in 1946.

At the same time, American and British delegates did push a liberal agenda.  Borgwardt argues that this period embodied a “New Deal for the world” ethos: US planners sought to embed economic and human-rights ideals into the new institutions.  One tangible sign was the focus on human rights and economic reconstructionReconstruction Full Description:The period immediately following the Civil War (1865–1877) when the federal government attempted to integrate formerly enslaved people into society. Its premature end and the subsequent rollback of rights necessitated the Civil Rights Movement a century later. Reconstruction saw the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments and the election of Black politicians across the South. However, it ended with the withdrawal of federal troops and the rise of Jim Crow. The Civil Rights Movement is often described as the “Second Reconstruction,” an attempt to finish the work that was abandoned in 1877. Critical Perspective:Understanding Reconstruction is essential to understanding the Civil Rights Movement. It provides the historical lesson that legal rights are fragile and temporary without federal enforcement. The “failure” of Reconstruction was not due to Black incapacity, but to a lack of national political will to defend Black rights against white violence—a dynamic that activists in the 1960s were determined not to repeat.
Read more even in these first days .  Eleanor Roosevelt’s appointment to the Human Rights Commission (announced in London) symbolized this institutionalization of values.

Mark Mazower, meanwhile, reminds us that the UN was by no means an entirely fresh canvas.  In many ways it inherited the League’s structures and personnel.  Indeed, a wartime refugee and UN observer joked that the conference hall felt like an old League meeting – “a few familiar Geneva faces were in the Central Hall today,” namely Viscount Cecil and Wellington Koo (the latter being “the only delegate… who played an important role in [the League’s] first meeting in Geneva”) .  This continuity helped the UN to function smoothly, but it also meant that old imperial concerns (such as the status of colonies and boundaries) were carried over.  Mazower argues that the UN’s “ideological origins” were tied up in empire – a point foreshadowed by London’s mix of idealistic rhetoric and diplomatic brinkmanship.

In sum, London 1946 set the tone for the UN’s complex history.  On one hand there was enthusiasm and high aspiration – the delegates literally embodied a post-war dream of collective security and human rights.  On the other hand, the first votes and speeches already revealed the limitations.  The superpowers treated the UN as another stage for their strategic games.  The veto’s debut in February 1946 (against Western initiatives in Syria/Lebanon) was an early portent of years of stalemate.  And neutral countries realized that the UN’s Charter meant they could be drawn into conflicts under an Article 51 call for collective action , which many would only do selectively.  Thus the London meetings were not only a launch but also a microcosm of what was to come: noble goals wedded to hard power politics, a bit like the later League – but now under the shadow of a very new rivalry.

Historiographical Perspectives

Historians have long debated what London 1946 tells us about the UN’s character.  On one view (associated with Gaddis and Leffler), the UN from its inception was “hobbled by” the emerging Cold War, meaning its potential was constrained by the mutual suspicions of Washington and Moscow.  Gaddis notes that even planning for the Atomic Energy Commission was already entangled in superpower bargaining.  Leffler similarly emphasizes that international institutions often reflect “realist” power concerns; London showed this when security issues (Iran, Greece) overrode the founding-era optimism.  Scholars like Roberts highlight the Soviet side: for them, the USSR’s delegates acted with clear strategic calculations, as when the Soviet bloc tried to control Eastern Europe’s representation (e.g. Ukraine’s presence) and brought friendly governments into the UN to vote with Moscow.

By contrast, scholars like Elizabeth Borgwardt highlight the moral dimensions evident in 1946.  She calls 1945–46 a “zeitgeist” of transformative optimism, where US planners expected the UN to be part of a global “New Deal.”  The very fact that London’s Assembly immediately tackled issues like atomic control and human rights (chaired by Americans) shows that institutionalizing such ideals was a priority .  Eleanor Roosevelt’s role is often singled out: as US delegate she quickly moved to form the Human Rights Commission, signaling the American commitment to enshrining rights in the UN system.  In this light, London was not just about power blocs but also about building new norms.

Mark Mazower provides a third perspective, reminding us that the London meetings fit into a longer institutional lineage.  The physical and personal continuity with the League of Nations era (from Cecil and Koo’s presence to the reuse of European meeting halls) meant that the UN was not a completely novel experiment.  Many of its assumptions (about majority voting, collective security) came straight from the 1920s.  Therefore, the events in London can be read as both a fresh beginning and a somewhat familiar reprise – a tension central to Mazower’s critique of the UN’s origins.

Conclusion

The first UN session in London was historic and fraught.  In those icy January weeks, the new world body took form: it welcomed war-torn nations into one assembly and began drafting the rules of global order.  Delegates pledged cooperation on atomic energy, human rights, and post-war recovery .  But they also proved that peacemaking would not be easy.  Veteran journalists noted the “swing to the left” in policy (with socialist leaders like Attlee and Spaak in leading roles ) even as “old rivalries” lurked beneath the surface.  Indeed, as scholars remind us, London 1946 already bore the imprint of the coming Cold War – a reality check on the UN’s high ideals.

In retrospect, the London meetings stand at a crossroads of history: they capture the simultaneous birth of hope and of conflict in the postwar world.  Every major UN organ was set in motion: the Assembly voted and the Council met, the Court was populated, and new commissions formed.  Yet even as the world’s diplomats shook hands and sang “God Save the King,” alliances silently fell into place, and powerful nations tested the limits of the Charter’s promises.  The legacy of London 1946 is thus twofold: it was the first spark of a truly global governance, and the first glimpse of its limits under geopolitical pressure.  Historians today still draw lessons from that inaugural session – a reminder that international institutions carry the hopes of their time, but also the tensions of their makers .