For decades, the narrative of Pakistani politics has been dominated by a familiar trinity of power: the military establishment, feudal landowning dynasties, and a political elite operating through networks of patronage and kinship. The vast rural peasantry formed the electoral base, while the urban rich coexisted with the state apparatus. However, the early 21st century has witnessed the emergence of a transformative new force that is fundamentally challenging this entrenched order: a rapidly expanding, increasingly assertive urban middle class. This essay will argue that this socio-economic group, forged by unprecedented urbanization, a revolution in media and communication, and greater access to education, has become a key driver of political change. Its rise has reshaped the public sphere, fueled new forms of political mobilization, and catalyzed a demand for a new social contract based on accountability, transparency, and meritocracy—a demand powerfully, if imperfectly, channeled by the rise of Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). The struggle between this ascendant class and Pakistan’s traditional power structures is now a central fault line in the nation’s politics.
Demographics of Change: Urbanization and Education
The bedrock of this social transformation is a dramatic demographic shift. Pakistan is rapidly urbanizing. While official figures often underestimate the trend, it is estimated that over 40% of the population now lives in urban areas, with megacities like Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabad becoming sprawling hubs of economic and social activity. This migration from village to city is more than a change of address; it represents a profound sociological rupture. In the city, the ascriptive identities and patronage bonds of the rural biradari (clan) system weaken, replaced by more anonymous, monetized relationships and nuclear family structures. The migrant arrives with new aspirations for education, employment, and social mobility for their children.
This aspiration is fuelled by an educational explosion. A significant expansion of both public and, crucially, private universities has created a large cohort of graduates each year. This generation is not only more educated than its parents but is also more globally connected, often through the experience of family members working overseas whose remittances both bolster the national economy and expand the horizons of those at home. This new middle class is economically diverse, ranging from lower-level salaried employees and small business owners to prosperous professionals and corporate managers. What unites them is a shared ethos: a belief in upward mobility through education and merit, a deep frustration with systemic corruption, and a growing impatience with a political system they see as being run by and for the old elites.
The Media Revolution: Creating a New Public Sphere
If urbanization provided the demographic base, a concurrent media revolution provided the voice and the platform. For most of Pakistan’s history, the state-controlled Pakistan Television (PTV) and Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (Radio Pakistan) held a monopoly on information, shaping a singular, officially sanctioned national narrative. This changed decisively in 2002 when General Pervez Musharraf’s regime deregulated the electronic media, licensing dozens of private television channels.
The impact was transformative. The advent of 24/7 private news channels, such as Geo News, ARY News, and Dunya News, broke the state’s information monopoly. Aggressive, live coverage of political events, from lawyers’ movements to terrorist attacks, created a new, unruly, and immensely influential public sphere. Talk shows became arenas for heated debate, directly challenging politicians and military spokespersons in a way previously unimaginable. This new media ecology did not just report on events; it actively shaped them, setting agendas and holding power accountable in real-time.
The revolution entered a second, even more disruptive phase with the proliferation of the internet and social media. Platforms like Facebook, Twitter (now X), and YouTube provided a direct, unmediated channel for political communication, particularly for the youth. They enabled the rapid dissemination of information (and misinformation), the organization of protests, and the creation of viral political narratives that could bypass traditional media gatekeepers. This digital public sphere became the natural habitat of the urban, educated middle class, allowing it to articulate a collective identity and a political vision that stood in stark opposition to the established order. However, this sphere is not neutral; it is also contested by the state and powerful media owners—the “Lords of the Media”—whose interests are often deeply entangled with the very establishment the new middle class seeks to challenge.
The Political Outsider: Imran Khan and the PTI Phenomenon
For years, the political energies of this emerging class had no coherent national outlet. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), despite their differences, both represented the politics of patronage, dynasty, and compromise with the establishment. This vacuum was filled by Imran Khan, a charismatic cricket legend turned politician. His party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), founded in 1996, languished on the political margins for over a decade. However, its message began to resonate powerfully with the new middle class in the 2010s.
The PTI’s platform was tailor-made for this demographic. Its core pillars were a vehement anti-corruption crusade, a promise of a “Naya Pakistan” (New Pakistan) based on meritocracy and good governance, and a nationalist rhetoric of self-reliance. Khan presented himself as the clean, trustworthy outsider who could break the corrupt duopoly of the PPP and PML-N. A pivotal moment came in October 2011, when the PTI held a massive rally in Lahore that stunned political observers. It was not populated by traditional crowds bussed in from feudal estates, but by a sea of urban, middle-class Pakistanis—students, professionals, and women—who had organized themselves, often through social media.
The PTI’s rise was inextricably linked to its masterful use of the new media landscape. Khan was a compelling television performer and an even more effective user of social media, where he could speak directly to millions of followers, bypassing critical journalists and crafting his own narrative. This direct connection allowed the PTI to mobilize its base, raise funds, and wage a permanent campaign, culminating in its electoral victory in 2018—a victory that was widely seen as the political coming-of-age of Pakistan’s urban middle class.
Clashing Values: The Middle Class vs. The Old Guard
The rise of this new force represents a fundamental clash of values with Pakistan’s traditional power structure. The middle-class ethos of accountability directly challenges the culture of impunity that has long protected the political and military elite. Its belief in meritocracy is anathema to the system of sifarish (favoritism) and kinship that governs much of public life. Its urban, often more cosmopolitan, outlook conflicts with the more socially conservative and parochial politics of the rural heartlands that have traditionally determined electoral outcomes.
This class largely views the feudal (wadera) system not as a legitimate source of authority but as an anachronistic obstacle to progress. Its members are taxpayers who demand to know what the state is delivering in return, a transactional relationship alien to the deferential patron-client dynamics of rural politics. Furthermore, while not uniformly secular, significant segments of this class hold more privatized religious views and are often suspicious of the political use of Islam by the state and religious parties, preferring a focus on governance and economic development.
Limitations and Contradictions of the New Force
Despite its transformative impact, the Pakistani middle class is not a monolithic or omnipotent political actor. Its political consciousness is often intertwined with a deep-seated nationalism that can be easily mobilized by the military establishment, illustrating that its relationship with the “deep state” is complex and sometimes symbiotic rather than purely antagonistic. The establishment itself initially saw the PTI and the middle-class movement as a useful tool to weaken the traditional political parties, only to find it had unleashed a force that could become independently powerful and challenging to control.
The middle class also exhibits political contradictions. Its demand for accountability can, at times, tip into a frustration with the messy compromises of democracy itself, making it potentially susceptible to populist promises of authoritarian solutions. Economically, it remains vulnerable; inflation and economic stagnation can quickly erode its gains, revealing the precariousness of its status and the thin line separating it from the poor.
The PTI’s own tenure in government from 2018 to 2022 exposed the limitations of its model. The transition from a protest movement to a party of governance proved immensely difficult. While it launched popular social welfare programs, its management of the economy was widely criticized, and it struggled to dismantle the entrenched bureaucratic and institutional inertia it had long railed against. Its fall from power and subsequent persecution have highlighted the immense resilience of the old guard and the severe constraints any reformist project faces in Pakistan.
Conclusion: An Unfinished Transformation
The rise of Pakistan’s urban middle class is one of the most significant socio-political developments of the last two decades. It has irrevocably altered the country’s public sphere, introduced a new vocabulary of rights and accountability, and demonstrated that electoral politics can no longer be the sole preserve of feudal dynasties and their patronage networks. The energy of this class, channeled through new media and embodied by the PTI, has broken the political mould.
However, this transformation is far from complete. The struggle between the aspirational politics of the middle class and the resilient, entrenched power of the military-feudal-industrial complex defines the current political impasse. The middle class has proven it can win elections, but the traditional establishment has demonstrated it still holds the ultimate levers of power. The future of Pakistani democracy will hinge on whether a sustainable accommodation can be found—whether the state can evolve to meet the demands of its burgeoning, assertive middle class for a more transparent, accountable, and merit-based social contract, or whether this new force will be co-opted, fragmented, or suppressed by the old order it seeks to replace. The battle for the soul of Pakistan is now, in large part, a battle over the aspirations of this transformative class.
Further Reading:
· Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan: A Hard Country. PublicAffairs, 2011.
· Zaidi, S. Akbar. Issues in Pakistan’s Economy: A Political Economy Perspective. Oxford University Press, 2015.
· Jaffrelot, Christophe (ed.). Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures. Random House India, 2016.
· Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Pluto Press, 2007.
· Hussain, Mushahid (ed.). Pakistan’s Electronic Media: Revolution, Challenges and Prospects. Institute of Policy Studies, 2015.
· World Bank Reports on Urbanization in South Asia and Pakistan.
· PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency) reports on elections and media.
· International Crisis Group. Reports on Pakistan’s Political Development.
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