The political history of Pakistan is often narrated as a pendulum swinging between periods of troubled civilian rule and direct military dictatorship. This conventional framing, while chronologically accurate, fundamentally misrepresents the nature of power in the South Asian nation. It suggests that the military is an external force that periodically “intervenes” in politics before returning to the barracks. A more accurate analysis reveals a far more entrenched reality: the Pakistani military is not an intervener in the political sphere but its most consistent and powerful occupant. It functions as the country’s premier political institution—a “state within a state” or a “garrison state” that has systematically shaped Pakistan’s governance, economy, and foreign policy to serve its own corporate interests. This enduring dominance, established in the state’s fragile infancy and meticulously institutionalized over decades, has become the primary obstacle to the development of sustainable democracy and the most defining feature of the Pakistani polity.
The Foundational Vacuum and the Inherited “Steel Frame”
The emergence of the military as Pakistan’s central political institution was not preordained, but was made probable by the catastrophic circumstances of the state’s birth. The partition of 1947 delivered a “moth-eaten” Pakistan grappling with a refugee crisis of unimaginable scale, a fractured economy, and territorial disputes with India from its first days. Crucially, the new state suffered a profound institutional deficit. The Muslim League, which had led the movement for Pakistan, was a broad ideological coalition rather than a robust political party with deep grassroots organization. It rapidly devolved into a vehicle for patronage, unable to provide stable, democratic governance.
Most devastatingly, the state was orphaned by the early deaths of its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in 1948, and its first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, assassinated in 1951. This created a power vacuum at the highest level of the state. Into this void stepped the only institutions that possessed a semblance of organization, discipline, and a pan-Pakistani worldview: the civil bureaucracy and the military. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the inherited “steel frame” of the British Raj, and the senior officer corps of the army shared a common ethos that was deeply skeptical of what they viewed as the chaos and corruption of democratic politics. They saw themselves as the natural guardians of the national interest, a perception that quickly translated into political control. From the outset, the “State of Pakistan” was being governed not by politicians, but by administrators and generals who believed that elected representatives required firm supervision.
The Institutionalization of Power: From Ayub Khan to the “Doctrine of Necessity”
The period between 1947 and 1958 witnessed a steady erosion of civilian authority, with the military and bureaucracy acting as the real arbiters of power behind a thin democratic façade. This process culminated in 1958, when President Iskander Mirza—a former civil servant himself—abrogated the constitution and imposed martial law, appointing General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Ayub promptly deposed Mirza, consolidating the military’s direct hold on power.
Ayub Khan’s decade-long rule (1958-1969) was critical in institutionalizing the military’s political role. It was not merely a temporary suspension of democracy, but an attempt to create a new, permanent political order with the military at its core. Ayub justified his rule through a philosophy of “controlled democracy,” implementing a system of “Basic Democracies” designed to create a pliable, indirect electoral college that would legitimize his authority without granting genuine political power to the masses. His reign cemented two enduring patterns. First, it demonstrated that the military could govern directly and, for a time, deliver a measure of stability and economic growth, thereby building its own narrative of indispensability. Second, it established a damaging symbiosis with the judiciary. The Supreme Court’s invention of the “doctrine of necessity” provided a legal and constitutional fig leaf for the coup, creating a precedent that would be repeatedly used to legitimize future military takeovers. The military now had a partner in the judiciary that would sanitize its political interventions.
However, the military’s claim to competent stewardship was severely damaged by the 1965 war with India. The conflict ended in a stalemate, shattering the image of military invincibility and leading to widespread public discontent. Ayub’s downfall in 1969 demonstrated that direct military rule carried significant political risks, a lesson that would inform the army’s future strategies of exercising power from behind the scenes.
The Bhutto Interregnum and the Zia Counter-Revolution
The humiliating loss of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 was a catastrophic blow to the military’s prestige. This created an opening for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a charismatic civilian leader, to ascend to power and attempt the most serious reassertion of civilian control in Pakistan’s history. Bhutto sought to tame the military by purging its senior leadership, promoting officers based on loyalty, and creating a counterweight force, the Federal Security Force (FSF). His nationalization policies also challenged the economic interests of the military establishment.
Bhutto’s project, however, was short-lived. His authoritarian tendencies and contentious policies created powerful enemies. In 1977, following disputed elections, the army under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq seized power in a coup that would prove to be the most transformative in Pakistan’s history. Zia did not merely restore military rule; he deepened and broadened it, ensuring the army would become nearly unassailable.
Zia’s strategies were multifaceted:
- Ideological Legitimacy: He launched a comprehensive process of “IslamizationIslamization Full Description:The state-led process of bringing Pakistan’s legal, educational, and social systems into conformity with a specific interpretation of Islamic law. This was most aggressively pursued under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq to consolidate power. Islamization transformed the identity of the state. Originally founded as a homeland for Muslims (a nationalist project), the state shifted toward becoming a theocratic fortress. Laws regarding evidence, banking, and social conduct were rewritten to align with strict Sharia interpretations, and the education system was overhauled to emphasize religious ideology over secular subjects.
Critical Perspective:This process was primarily a tool of political legitimacy. Lacking a democratic mandate, the military regime used religion to sanitize its rule and silence opposition, labelling dissent as anti-Islamic. The structural legacy has been the marginalization of religious minorities and women, and the empowerment of hard-line clerical groups that now challenge the authority of the state itself.
Read more,” enshrining a particular version of Sunni Islam into law and public life. This provided a new, ideological justification for military rule, positioning the army as the defender of Pakistan’s Islamic identity. - Bureaucratic Embedding: Military officers were systematically placed in key positions throughout the civilian bureaucracy, state-owned enterprises, and even educational institutions, creating a vast network of influence that persisted beyond his rule.
- Economic Empires: Zia vastly expanded the military’s formal economic interests, known as “Milbus” (military business). Foundations like the Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, and Shaheen Foundation grew into massive conglomerates with interests in banking, insurance, real estate, cement, and cereal. This gave the officer corps a direct, material stake in the status quo, transforming the military into a powerful economic class.
- Foreign Policy Monopoly: By making the military the primary architect and beneficiary of the U.S.-backed jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Zia ensured that the army would control the most sensitive aspects of foreign policy, particularly regarding Afghanistan and India.
The Post-Zia Playbook: Guided Democracy and Remote Control
Zia’s death in 1988 did not mark a return to genuine civilian supremacy. Instead, the military refined its role from that of a direct ruler to that of a permanent manager, operating a system of “guided democracy.” The playbook for this era involved several key instruments:
· Political Engineering: The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate became the primary tool for manipulating the political landscape. This involved creating and funding “king’s parties” like the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) to block the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) from power, co-opting politicians, and manipulating electoral outcomes to ensure no civilian government could become strong enough to challenge the military’s core interests.
· Constitutional Manipulation: The infamous Eighth Amendment, introduced by Zia, gave the president—a figure often aligned with the establishment—the power to dismiss elected governments. This “press-button” power was used repeatedly in the 1990s to dismiss governments of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.
· Media and Narrative Control: The military establishment cultivated influence over major media outlets to shape public opinion and ensure its narrative of being the ultimate guardian of national security remained dominant.
This system of remote control persisted until 1999, when Nawaz Sharif’s attempt to assert authority over the military leadership by appointing a new army chief backfired spectacularly. The new chief, General Pervez Musharraf, seized power in a coup, demonstrating that the threat of direct military rule remained the establishment’s ultimate weapon against a recalcitrant civilian leadership.
The Enduring Imperatives: National Security and the India-Centric Doctrine
The military’s political and economic dominance is perpetually justified by a single, overarching narrative: the existential threat from India. The unresolved conflict over Kashmir, the wars of 1948, 1965, and 1971, and the nuclear standoff have allowed the military to frame itself as the nation’s sole protector. This India-centric national security doctrine serves to justify the military’s vast budget, its control over foreign policy, and the perpetuation of a national security state that prioritizes military spending over social development.
Any significant civilian move towards détente with India is often viewed by the military establishment with deep suspicion, as a peace dividend could undermine the rationale for its privileged position. The military’s continued patronage of non-state militant proxies as tools of foreign policy in Kashmir and Afghanistan is a direct outcome of this paradigm, ensuring that tensions remain managed but unresolved, thereby preserving the military’s institutional primacy.
Conclusion: The Unchallenged Core of the State
The trajectory of the Pakistani military is one of a relentless ascent from a professional fighting force to the country’s most powerful political and economic entity. It is an institution that fills the vacuum left by weak political parties, commands a vast commercial empire, shapes the national ideology, and directs the country’s strategic destiny. The concept of a “garrison state” is not a metaphor but a precise description of a polity where the military is the unchallenged core of the state.
The implications of this reality are profound. It means that Pakistan’s repeated experiments with democracy have been conducted on a field heavily tilted in the military’s favor. True civilian supremacy remains a distant goal, not because of a lack of popular will, but because it requires confronting an institution that is deeply embedded in every facet of the state and economy. The central political question for Pakistan in the 21st century is not whether the military will stage another coup, but whether any civilian government can ever establish genuine authority over this parallel state. Until that fundamental challenge is met, the pendulum of Pakistani politics will continue to swing, not between democracy and dictatorship, but between different modes of military rule.
Further Reading:
· Haqqani, Husain. Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military. Carnegie Endowment, 2005.
· Siddiqa, Ayesha. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Pluto Press, 2007.
· Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997. Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000.
· Cohen, Stephen P. The Pakistan Army. Oxford University Press, 1998.
· Jalal, Ayesha. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
· Fair, C. Christine. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. Oxford University Press, 2014.
· Shah, Agil. The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. Harvard University Press, 2014.
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