nuremberg-trials
The series of military tribunals held in Nuremberg between 1945 and 1949, in which the Allied powers prosecuted leading Nazis for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the new category of crimes against peace. They established the principle that individuals could be held criminally responsible for state-ordered atrocities.
The International Military Tribunal, which tried 24 major war criminals between November 1945 and October 1946, was established by the four Allied powers under the London Charter of August 1945. The charges were unprecedented: crimes against peace (planning and waging aggressive war), war crimes (violations of the laws and customs of war), and crimes against humanity (murder, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts against any civilian population). The novelty of the proceedings was matched by their scale: 24 defendants including Göring, Ribbentrop, Hess, Speer, and others; 403 open sessions; testimony from hundreds of witnesses and thousands of documents. Twelve defendants were sentenced to death, including Göring (who evaded execution by suicide), Ribbentrop, and the military commanders Keitel and Jodl. The subsequent Nuremberg trials of 1946–49 tried members of the Einsatzgruppen, doctors who conducted medical experiments, lawyers who implemented racial law, and industrialists who used slave labour. The trials established the principle of individual criminal responsibility for state crimes, the illegality of aggressive war as an instrument of national policy, and the principle that following superior orders does not absolve individuals of criminal responsibility for atrocities.
The Nuremberg trials have been criticised on both procedural and substantive grounds — as ‘victors’ justice’ applying ex post facto law to crimes that were not internationally prohibited when committed, and for excluding Allied conduct (the firebombing of German cities, the atomic bombings, the Soviet mass atrocities) from the tribunal’s jurisdiction. These criticisms have substance: the tribunal was not impartial and the selection of defendants reflected the political requirements of the victors. But the alternative — allowing those responsible for the Holocaust and the war of aggression to walk free or be tried by national courts with limited jurisdiction — would have entrenched impunity rather than established accountability. The trials’ most enduring contribution is not the specific verdicts but the legal architecture they created: the principles of international criminal responsibility, the definition of crimes against humanity, and the template for subsequent international tribunals from the ICTY to the ICC all build on Nuremberg. Whether the precedent has been consistently applied — clearly it has not — is a different question from whether it constitutes progress that individual criminal responsibility for mass atrocity is now a recognised principle of international law.
Leave a Reply