The 1948 Arab–Israeli War broke out immediately after Israel declared independence on 14 May 1948.  Armies of Egypt, Transjordan (Jordan), Syria, Iraq and contingents from Lebanon and other Arab countries entered the British Mandate territory on 15 May, each pursuing its own objectives .  Arab leaders claimed they were “liberating” Palestine, but in practice their agendas diverged sharply.  Jordan’s King ʿAbdullah sought to annex the West Bank, while Egypt’s King Farouk aimed to stake a claim to Gaza.  Syria and Iraq had pan-Arab ambitions of their own.  These conflicting goals – underscored by secret British support for ʿAbdullah – severely undermined Arab unity.  As a result, Arab armies failed to coordinate effectively.  A 1987 study by Avi Shlaim notes that by war’s end the main beneficiaries were Zionist forces (which expanded territory far beyond the UN plan) and King Abdullah (who captured the West Bank) – while “the losers were the Palestinians,” with three-quarters expelled and “Palestine” wiped off the map .  We now examine each state’s motives, preparedness, campaigns and impact on Palestinian statelessness.

Egypt

Egypt entered the war with mixed motives.  King Farouk’s government was divided: Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Nokrashy initially urged caution, warning in May 1948 that the Egyptian Army was unprepared .  Farouk – wary of rival Hashemite influence and internal unrest – overruled Nokrashy and committed forces to Palestine. Egypt’s official aim was to halt ZionismZionism Full Description:A modern political ideology and nationalist movement that advocates for the establishment and maintenance of a Jewish state in Palestine. Critically, it is defined as a settler-colonial project that necessitates the systematic displacement, dispossession, and erasure of the indigenous Palestinian population to establish demographic and political supremacy. Zionism emerged in Europe not merely as a response to antisemitism, but as a colonial movement adopting the racial and imperial logic of the 19th century. It posited that Jewish safety could only be guaranteed through the creation of an ethno-state. Because the target territory was already inhabited, the ideology was fundamentally built on the “logic of elimination”—the requirement to transfer, expel, or subjugate the native Arab population to create an artificial majority. Critical Perspective:Structurally, Zionism functions as an exclusionary ideology. By defining the state exclusively as the expression of self-determination for Jewish people, it inherently renders indigenous Palestinians as demographic threats rather than citizens. Critics argue that this necessitates a permanent state of violence, apartheid, and military occupation, as the state must constantly police, cage, and destroy the native population to prevent them from reclaiming their land and rights. Further Reading The End of the British Mandate: Imperial Withdrawal and the Onset of War The UN Partition Plan of 1947: A Spark in a TinderboxThe 1948 War: Nakba and Independence Plan Dalet: A Blueprint for Conflict The Palestinian Nakba: A National Trauma Arab States’ Intervention and the Widening War The Palestinian Refugee Crisis The 1949 Armistice Agreements: A Frozen Conflict Israel’s Transformation: State-Building and Immigration The Arab World After 1948: Political Upheaval The Legacy of 1948: The Politics of Memory , but it also sought to counter Transjordan’s claims and assert influence in Gaza.  In September 1948 Egypt organized the short-lived All-Palestine Government under Amin al-Husayni in Gaza, partly to undercut Abdullah’s ambitions .  However, Egyptian support for this nominal Palestinian government was superficial and ultimately came too late .  Egypt even forced al-Husayni to leave Gaza for Cairo, undermining Palestinian leadership .

Militarily, Egypt confined its efforts to southern Palestine.  Egyptian forces entered the Gaza corridor but did not mount a deep thrust into the Negev or towards Tel Aviv.  Instead they held defensive lines around Gaza.  In October 1948 Israel launched Operation Yoav, a powerful offensive that shattered the Egyptian southern front.  Israeli troops drove a wedge through the Gaza-Beersheba corridor, took Beersheba (21 Oct) and Ashdod, and surrounded Egyptian units at al-Faluja .  Notably, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser later became trapped with Egyptian troops in the Faluja pocket, which only surrendered after the war.  By late December Israel’s Operation Horev had pushed Egyptians back into the Sinai.

Egypt’s war effort was hampered by poor preparation and limited objectives.  Historian Fawaz Gerges notes that Egypt had not planned for a full-scale campaign and its army lacked morale .  After Yoav, Egypt lost much of the Negev and could no longer sustain the Gaza government .  In the aftermath, Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip but kept it under tight military control.  Its military authorities discouraged independent Palestinian politics in Gaza, allowing only limited nationalist activity .  Egypt formally renounced any territorial claim to Palestine (unlike Jordan) , but its reluctance to foster Palestinian self-rule helped set the stage for Gaza’s statelessness.

Transjordan (Jordan)

Transjordan (modern Jordan) was the most powerful and effective Arab army in 1948.  Its Hashemite king, ʿAbdullah I, had long aimed to annex Palestine.  British diplomats privately encouraged him, seeing him as a more acceptable ruler than Haj Amin al-Husseini .  Historians note that Abdullah entered the war not primarily to establish a Palestinian state, but to expand his own kingdom.  He reportedly “preferred a Jewish state as his neighbor to one run by [Husseini],” and even made secret arrangements with Zionist leaders .  In April 1948 he began negotiating with Jewish officials, and in mid-1948 he helped finalize the Jericho Conference declaration, which proclaimed him “King of Arab Palestine and Transjordan.”  (On 1 December 1948, that Congress affirmed union with Jordan and Abdullah announced he would annex the West Bank .)

Jordan’s army – the British-trained Arab Legion under Glubb Pasha – was well-organized and disciplined.  In May 1948 it moved into the Mandate’s central highlands.  The Legion fought at Latrun to blockade Jerusalem and later at the battles of Lydda–Ramle.  In July Israeli Operation Danny broke the siege of Jerusalem and captured Lydda and Ramle from Arab irregulars, but by then Jordanian forces had already seized the key hill country and were pressing into the plains.  By October the Arab Legion controlled East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, Jenin and surrounding areas.  Jordan effectively secured all of the West Bank, later formalizing this in 1950 annexation.

King Abdullah’s ambitions generated bitter rivalry with other Arab states.  Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia feared that his annexation of Palestine would weaken their own influence .  They ultimately created the All-Palestine Government in Gaza (September 1948) largely as a counterbalance to Abdullah .  In private the king swore to oppose that government “to the end,” with British support for its destruction .  Transjordan’s war aim was to claim Arab lands allocated by the UN to a Palestinian state – and it largely succeeded.  After the armistice, Jordan held East Jerusalem and the West Bank, denying Palestinians an independent state while absorbing their population and lands into Jordan.

Syria

Syria’s participation was driven by both pan-Arab nationalism and rivalry with Jordan.  President Shukri al-Quwatli and military leaders were irritated by Abdullah’s behind-the-scenes deals with Zionists.  Syria’s army was tiny and politicized, but it sent forces to northern Palestine.  In mid-May Syrian regulars and the Arab Liberation Army (ALA) – a volunteer force organized by Haj Amin – advanced into Upper Galilee.  They fought around Safad, Tiberias and later at Mishmar HaEmek and Al-Dawayima.  Syrian troops also held the Golan heights adjacent to Lake Kinneret.  However, Israeli counter-attacks (e.g. Operation Hiram on 29–31 Oct 1948) destroyed the ALA presence and forced Syria’s forces into a few isolated pockets.  Syria never achieved its goals; by war’s end it was effectively pushed back to its borders except for some occupation of parts of the Galilee.

Politically, Syria resented Transjordan’s primacy in Arab League plans.  Syrian leaders openly objected when Abdullah sought to absorb Palestinian territories into Jordan, insisting that “neither Syria nor Egypt” would let Palestinian lands fall under Hashemite rule .  Syria had also hoped to bring Upper Galilee into a broader Greater Syria.  Ultimately, the Syrian army’s disjointed campaign and lack of coordination with allies meant it could not advance far.  Its limited successes in Safad (May 1948) and minor border skirmishes were outweighed by defeats at Hiram and later inability to join forces with Iraqi units.

Iraq

Iraq’s involvement reflected King Faisal II and Regent ‘Abd al-Ilah’s own rivalry with ʿAbdullah.  Baghdad sought greater influence in the Levant and saw Transjordan’s expansion as a threat to Hashemite prestige.  Prime Minister Nuri al-Said also cultivated pan-Arab credentials.  Iraq eventually sent an expeditionary force to Palestine: around 3,000 troops (infantry and an armored brigade) crossed the Jordan in late May under General Nur ad-Din Mahmud.  These forces advanced north into the Jordan Valley and Samaria.

The Iraqis initially attacked the Jewish settlement of Gesher on 10 May but were repelled.  They then moved into the “Jaba Triangle” (Jenin–Tulkarm–Nablus area) to exert pressure from the east.  On 29 May the Israelis counter-attacked at Jenin; Iraqi units held their ground after three days of heavy fighting .  After this, Iraqi forces remained largely static and were soon overshadowed by local Jordanian operations.  By autumn the Iraqis were mostly confined to the area around Jenin and Nablus.  They briefly attempted another advance north from Tulkarm on 25 May (seizing Geulim) but were driven back by the Israeli Alexandroni Brigade .  By the first truce (June 1948) the Iraqis had grown to about 10,000 men and by war’s end to roughly 18,000 , but they made no significant new gains.  After the final truce, Iraq agreed to withdraw to avoid direct confrontation with other Arabs.

Iraq’s expeditionary force had mixed effectiveness.  It had decent equipment (British rifles, artillery, armor) but suffered from poor planning and unclear objectives.  Its leadership often clashed with ʿAbdullah over command in the north.  Ultimately, the Iraqi contingent performed no decisive offensive; it held parts of Samaria until the armistice and was credited only with tying down Israeli units near Jenin.  Its casualty toll was significant (about 200 killed and 500 wounded) but far outweighed by the territorial losses suffered by Palestinians.  In the aftermath, Iraq – like Egypt – relinquished its hopes for a separate Palestinian state.

Lebanon

Lebanon’s war role was minimal.  President Bechara El Khoury’s government was split along sectarian lines and opposed to large-scale intervention.  The Lebanese army did not deploy into Palestine.  Instead, Lebanon allowed Muslim and Druze volunteers to join the Arab Liberation Army in the Safad region.  A handful of Lebanese troops (on the order of 1,000) operated in northern Palestine alongside Syrian irregulars .  Unlike the Hashemite regimes, Lebanon had little enthusiasm for the war, worried that it might empower Muslims domestically or provoke Jewish retaliation on its borders.  Thus, Lebanon’s contribution was almost entirely in name; the nascent country was “a belligerent in 1948 in name only” .  After the war, Israeli forces occupied a strip of southern Lebanon (the “Israeli Security Zone”), and Lebanon ended up hosting tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees, but it never had a large military presence in the conflict.

Inter-Arab Rivalries and the Palestinian Question

A dominant theme of 1948 was inter-Arab rivalry.  Rather than united support for Palestinian Arabs, each state prioritized its own interests.  Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria feared losing leadership if Abdullah dominated Palestine .  When the Arab League finally established the All-Palestine Government in Gaza (6 Sep 1948), it was mainly to “provide a focal point of opposition to ‘Abdullah,” as Shlaim observes .  King Farouk himself is quoted noting he joined the war only out of fear of losing ground to his Hashemite cousins .  Similarly, Lebanese Christians worried that a Palestinian state would empower Lebanon’s Muslim minority.  In short, each Arab state acted to prevent a rival from filling the vacuum in Palestine.

This distrust manifested in military disunity on the battlefield.  Egypt and Iraq declined Jordan’s requests to coordinate northern offensives, and Syria quarreled with both Jordan and Iraq.  There was no joint Arab high command.  The U.S. Office of the Historian notes that Israel’s forces, “now under joint command,” were able to seize the initiative, whereas Arab armies remained fragmented .  By 1949, scholars agreed that Arab failures owed much to their inability to collaborate.  As Shlaim concludes, Arab armies fought “ostensibly to liberate Palestine,” but in reality “conflicting agendas” turned the war into a general land-grab, to the detriment of the Palestinians .

Timeline of Major Operations and Diplomacy (1948–1949)

15 May 1948: The State of Israel declares independence.  Within hours, armies of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq and volunteers from Lebanon, Yemen and Saudi Arabia invade Mandate Palestine .  Irregular Palestinian and ALA bands are already fighting the HaganahHaganah Full Description:The primary Jewish paramilitary organization during the British Mandate. It evolved from a decentralized defense force into a conventional army, eventually forming the core of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) after independence. The Haganah (“The Defense”) was the military wing of the mainstream Zionist labor movement. Unlike the more radical Irgun or Lehi, it generally cooperated with British authorities until the post-war period. It was responsible for organizing illegal immigration and, later, executing Plan Dalet. Critical Perspective:The transformation of the Haganah illustrates the process of state-building. By absorbing or dismantling rival militias (sometimes violently, as in the Altalena Affair), the Haganah established the state’s monopoly on violence. However, its involvement in village expulsions challenges the myth of the “purity of arms” often associated with the IDF’s origins.
Read more.

June 1948: The first UN-brokered truce begins (11 June).  Clashes over Jerusalem and the central region preceded it.  On 11 July Israeli Operation Danny captures Lydda and Ramle, devastating two Arab cities in the Plain of Sharon.  (During this phase, Jordanian Legion and local Arab forces had held the approach to Jerusalem.)

22 September 1948: All-Palestine Government proclaimed in Gaza (Egyptian-sponsored, headed by Amin al-Husayni).  This nominal government – recognized by all Arab states except Transjordan – claims sovereignty over all Palestine but controls only Gaza .

15 October 1948: Israel breaks the second truce with Operation Yoav, aiming to link the Negev.  Over the next two weeks Israeli forces seize Beersheba (21 Oct), Bayt Jibrin (27 Oct), Isdud (28 Oct) and al-Majdal (4 Nov), carving a continuous corridor to Jewish Negev outposts .  Egyptian troops (including Nasser) become encircled in the al-Faluja pocket and hold out until after the war.  Israel also conducts the northern Operation Hiram (29–31 Oct), overrunning Safad, Tiberias and the Upper Galilee (ending most ALA resistance in the north).

1–5 December 1948: Jericho Conference of Palestinian leaders (under Jordanian auspices) proclaims King Abdullah as “King of Arab Palestine,” calls for union with Transjordan, and announces intention to annex the West Bank .  Egypt, Syria and other Arab states refuse to recognize this.

December 1948 – January 1949: Israel launches Operation Horev into the western Negev and northern Sinai, pushing Egyptian forces towards Gaza and Sinai.  Fierce fighting results in Israeli control of all Negev plateau except a Gaza enclave.

Feb–Jul 1949: Separate armistices are signed.  On 24 Feb 1949 Israel and Egypt agree on a cease-fire line (Egypt retains Gaza Strip); 3 Apr Israel–Jordan armistice (Jordan keeps West Bank, including East Jerusalem);

23 Mar Israel–Lebanon (essentially reverts to pre-war line except for Israel’s south Lebanon enclaves); 20 Jul Israel–Syria (Israel keeps most Galilee heights) .  The result is Israel enlarged to about 78% of mandatory Palestine, with Arabs confined to Gaza (Egypt) and the West Bank (Jordan).

Effectiveness and Limitations of Arab Action

Overall, the Arab military effort proved ineffective.  Each army was professionally outmatched by the Israelis’ centralized war effort.  Although the combined Arab forces initially outnumbered the Haganah, Arab armies lacked unified leadership, modern logistics and popular morale.  As historian Avi Shlaim notes, disjointed Arab attacks and poor coordination were key factors in defeat .  Several commentators have highlighted that the early Egyptian and Transjordanian high commands underestimated the campaign.  Jordan’s Abdullah told UN mediators in 1947 that he would not attack the Jewish state (preferring to expand his own realm instead) , while Egypt’s king only belatedly entered the war under pressure .

By contrast the Zionist forces had fought several months of civil war before May 1948, consolidating internal lines and absorbing large numbers of immigrants (providing manpower and arms).  The new Israeli army was relatively well-equipped by late 1948 and had a single unified command, whereas the Arab armies fought under different doctrines (British-trained Jordanians, multi-pronged Egyptian commands, French-trained Syrians, etc.) and sometimes refused to coordinate offensives.  For example, Jordan rejected an Arab League plan to converge on Nazareth in May 1948, preferring to stick close to its political objective of annexing the partition-designated Arab state .  Syrian troops refused to take strategic hills near Safad after May, fearing a trap, undermining Arab pressure in the north.  Egypt and Iraq maintained largely independent sectors in Gaza and Samaria.  In short, lack of a common strategy meant that Israeli counterattacks could exploit gaps between the Arab forces.

The limitations were not only military.  Arab rulers also proved unwilling to fully mobilize.  Egypt and Iraq, for instance, mobilized only a few dozen tanks and antiquated weapons.  There was a strict Arab arms embargo (except for Israel’s clandestine shipments via Czechoslovakia).  Many Arab states left matters in the hands of kingly regimes or volunteers rather than building sustained nationalist support.  By late 1948 even support for the All-Palestine Government waned.  As Walid Khalidi observes, “Most frequently, if [the Palestinians] were spoken for at all, they were spoken for by the Arab states, each of which had its own considerations,” often weak and self-interested .  In the end, Arab armies gained little territory in the official sense (Jordan only held what it captured; Lebanon virtually none), while large areas allotted to the Palestinian Arabs fell under Israeli control by armistice.

Consequences for Palestinians

The outcome of the 1948 war was catastrophic for the Palestinian people and their hopes of statehood.  About 700,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled during the fighting, becoming refugees in neighboring Arab countries and camps.  Most of historic Palestine came under Israeli administration (far beyond the UN partition plan), while Egypt and Jordan occupied Gaza and the West Bank respectively.

Crucially, Arab actions in 1948 left the Palestinians stateless and unable to establish their own government.  Jordan immediately annexed the West Bank in 1950, denying Palestinians any independent state, and granted them Jordanian citizenship.  In Gaza, Egypt did not annex the territory but ruled it indirectly; Palestinians there lacked political rights and were essentially subjects of the Egyptian military regime .  Historians note that after 1948 “most Palestinian political activity took place outside Palestine rather than inside” , because the occupying Arab regimes suppressed independent Palestinian institutions.  In Gaza, for example, the Egyptian commander banished any activists who might challenge his rule .  In the West Bank, the Jordanian administration treated Palestinians as part of Jordan, severely limiting any separate national movement.

Thus, although the Arab states ostensibly fought for Palestine, their post-war arrangements marginalized the Palestinians themselves.  The British historian Avi Shlaim summarises the broader outcome: “The winners were…King Abdullah… [and] the Zionists… The losers were the Palestinians.”  Seven decades later, Palestinians remained largely stateless, with the 1948 depopulations (the NakbaNakba Full Description: Arabic for “The Catastrophe.” It refers to the mass expulsion and flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes during the conflict. It is not merely a historical event but describes the ongoing condition of statelessness and dispossession faced by Palestinian refugees. The Nakba marks the foundational trauma of Palestinian identity. During the fighting that established the State of Israel, a vast majority of the Arab population in the territory either fled out of fear or were forcibly expelled by militias and the new army. Their villages were subsequently destroyed or repopulated to prevent their return.
Read more) leaving deep wounds.  Arab rulers’ short-term rivalry and tactical choices in 1948 – often aimed at partitioning Palestinian territory between them – directly shaped these long-term consequences .