The U.S. Army’s School of the Americas (SOA) was founded in 1946 in the Panama Canal Zone (Fort Gulick, near Fort Amador) as the “Latin American Ground School,” to provide technical and tactical training to Latin American allies. In July 1963 it was officially renamed the School of the Americas . From the beginning its Spanish-language curriculum reflected U.S. hemispheric-strategy aims. In the early Cold War the SOA taught courses in infantry, artillery, military police, radio repair, engineering and other basic skills . After the Cuban Revolution (1959), SOA’s mission shifted sharply. U.S. strategists adopted a “National Security Doctrine” that portrayed insurgencies and left-wing movements as an “international communist conspiracy” to be crushed by any means . President John F. Kennedy ordered SOA to emphasize anti-Communist counterinsurgency training for Latin American armies . By the 1970s the SOA curriculum explicitly included counterinsurgency operations to help Latin American regimes suppress guerrillas .
After the Panama Canal treaties of 1977 required U.S. withdrawal, the SOA suspended operations in Panama on September 21, 1984 and reopened in December 1984 at Fort Benning, Georgia . (The Panama campus had been a U.S. Army post known as Fort Sherman.) At Fort Benning the SOA continued training predominantly Latin American officers (eventually over 60,000 by 2000 ), along with some U.S. personnel. The school remained a cornerstone of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Latin America, even as its focus broadened from purely combat tactics to other “military operations other than war” by the 1990s . Throughout this period, the ideological core of SOA training was the region’s U.S.-promoted National Security Doctrine – the belief that internal “subversion” (any leftist organizing) justified harsh military measures.
National Security Doctrine and SOA Curriculum
The SOA’s curriculum was infused with the Cold War-era National Security Doctrine that militarized politics in Latin America. This doctrine, promoted by the Pentagon, held that civilian society itself was a potential enemy if seen as sympathetic to communism. SOA classes explicitly taught this worldview through courses on “Internal Defense,” “Revolutionary War,” and “Communist Ideology,” alongside traditional combat skills . As historian Lesley Gill notes, the SOA “introduced Latin American armies to the methods of assassination against compatriots,” connecting military training to U.S.-backed repression .
By the 1970s, the SOA offered a wide range of specialized courses. According to U.S. Army records and investigative reports, students took classes on light infantry tactics, small-unit patrolling, jungle warfare, and counterguerrilla operations. They also studied intelligence and counterintelligence, psychological warfare, and “civil affairs” (hearts-and-minds campaigns) . In the 1980s the curriculum notably included interrogations and torture techniques. Declassified Pentagon reports later confirmed that the SOA distributed eight Army manuals (written in Spanish) on topics like “Interrogation,” “Counterintelligence,” “Terrorism and Guerrilla WarfareGuerrilla Warfare Full Description:Guerrilla Warfare transforms the environment and the population into weapons. Unlike conventional war, which seeks to hold territory, the guerrilla strategy seeks to exhaust the enemy psychologically and economically. The fighter relies on the support of the local population for food, shelter, and intelligence, effectively “swimming” among the people like a fish in water. Critical Perspective:This mode of combat blurs the distinction between civilian and combatant, often leading to horrific consequences for the general population. It forces the occupying power into brutal counter-insurgency measures—villages are burned, populations displaced, and civilians targeted—which ultimately validates the guerrilla’s propaganda and deepens local resentment against the occupier. ,” and “Psychological Warfare” . (These became known as the controversial “School of Assassins” manuals when their contents – including advice on coercion – were leaked in 1996.) Instructors also ran U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Teams throughout Latin America to teach SOA-style methods locally .
While SOA organizers maintained that courses taught respect for law, opponents documented a grim reality: in practice many SOA-trained officers used their skills to target domestic dissidents and political opponents. During its years in Fort Benning, the School added only limited “civil-military” or democracy courses (after 1990) and its core mission remained combat counterinsurgency . By the mid-1990s SOA catalogues still listed courses on Intelligence, Psychological Operations, and small-unit infantry tactics . An Army audit reported that “by the 1970s [the] curriculum included courses on counterinsurgency operations” . In short, SOA trained Latin American officers to view broad swaths of their populations as threats, under the rubric of national security.
SOA and State Repression: Case Studies
Panama (Manuel Noriega): Among SOA’s most infamous alumni was Brigadier General Manuel Noriega, who led Panama’s military dictatorship (1983–89). Noriega, who became a CIA asset in the 1970s, attended SOA courses in 1966. According to historians, he studied infantry tactics, counterintelligence, military intelligence, and jungle warfare at SOA (and later took a U.S. psychological operations course at Fort Bragg). Noriega displayed the School’s insignia on his uniform and viewed SOA as formative . However, Noriega went on to run one of Latin America’s most brutal regimes, using the Panamanian army to repress political opponents and to enrich himself. Under Noriega’s command, Panama’s forces committed murders, torture, and support for Contra rebels, culminating in the murder of socialist opposition leader Jesús Eduardo Gallegos in 1986. Noriega’s case illustrates the dark side of SOA training: after being educated as an ally, he became a narco-dictator implicated in widespread violence.
El Salvador (Roberto D’Aubuisson and the Jesuits Massacre): In the 1970s and 80s, El Salvador’s military and paramilitary forces waged a vicious counterinsurgency against leftist guerrillas and insurgents. One leading figure was Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, founder of the far-right ARENA party and architect of the death squads. D’Aubuisson trained at SOA in 1972, taking a communications course . He later led National Guard intelligence and directed terror campaigns. In March 1980, Archbishop Óscar Romero was assassinated by Salvadoran soldiers under D’Aubuisson’s command – a killing that the U.N. truth commission later blamed on D’Aubuisson (himself a former SOA student) . That same year, four U.S. churchwomen (including Jean Donovan and Dorothy Kazel) were raped and murdered by Salvadoran paratroopers; three of the five soldiers involved had also attended the SOA . Perhaps the most infamous atrocity was the November 1989 Jesuit Massacre at the University of Central America (UCA) in San Salvador, where six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter were executed. A U.S. Congressional investigation found the hit squad included officers “trained at the School of the Americas.” Although D’Aubuisson had died in 1992, his protégés (many SOA-trained) clearly continued his “dirty war.”
Guatemala (Ríos Montt and Others): Guatemala’s civil war was among Latin America’s deadliest conflicts. In 1982–83, General Efraín Ríos Montt briefly led a regime that carried out a scorched-earth genocide against Maya villagers. The U.S. military had long backed Guatemalan armies (providing advisers and training, including at SOA). While Ríos Montt himself studied at the U.S. Army’s Special Warfare School, many of his generals and commanders were SOA graduates. Recent scholarship (e.g. by Kate Doyle and others) has documented how U.S.-trained Guatemalan officers implemented counterinsurgency doctrines and committed “targeted killings and torture” . In the 1990s Guatemala’s Truth Commission confirmed that scores of SOA-trained officers were implicated in massacres and disappearances. (Like their Salvadoran counterparts, they often invoked the National Security Doctrine: any supposed guerrilla sympathizer – even a village elder or priest – was a “subversive” to be eliminated.)
Southern Cone (Chile and Argentina, Operation Condor): In the Southern Cone, SOA’s influence linked directly to Operation Condor, a U.S.-backed coordination among military dictatorships in the 1970s. Declassified U.S. documents reveal that in the late 1960s and early 1970s Pentagon planners at the SOA and the Inter-American defense councils were quietly organizing multinational repression strategies . In 1974 security chiefs from Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia met in Buenos Aires to plan “coordinated actions against subversive targets,” according to a CIA memo . In practice this meant assassination flights, joint death squads and intelligence sharing under Pinochet’s Chilean intelligence agency (DINA) and Argentina’s ESMA. Many Condor operatives had attended the SOA: for example, Argentina’s dictator Jorge Rafael Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera (both top juntaJunta Full Description: A military or political group that rules a country after taking power by force. These military councils suspended constitutions, dissolved congresses, and banned political parties, claiming to act as “guardians” of the nation against internal corruption and subversion. A Junta is the administrative body of a military dictatorship. In the Southern Cone, these were often composed of the heads of the different branches of the armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force). They justified their seizure of power as a “state of exception” necessary to restore order, presenting themselves as apolitical technocrats saving the nation from the chaos of democracy. Critical Perspective:The Junta represents the militarization of politics. By treating the governance of a nation like a military operation, these regimes viewed distinct political opinions not as healthy democratic debate, but as insubordination or treason to be court-martialed. It replaced the messy consensus-building of democracy with the rigid hierarchy of the barracks. figures in 1976–81) received SOA training in Panama . In Chile, hardline commanders around Augusto Pinochet participated in SOA courses in the 1960s and 70s (though Pinochet himself did not formally attend the school). In Argentina’s “Dirty War” over 30,000 dissidents were “disappeared” by officers who had been steeped in SOA counter-guerilla tactics. As historian Patrice McSherry notes, U.S. support for Condor was tacit but “enabled” by the SOA’s training networks . In short, SOA graduates became key actors in the hemispheric strategy of repression: decades of military rule in Chile and Argentina were linked to networks forged at the SOA.
Curriculum Content: Counterinsurgency, Intelligence, and More
The SOA’s course catalog confirms its focus on domestic security warfare. A 1996 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report lists the School’s courses at Fort Benning in detail. Many were combat-tactical – e.g. infantry tactics, patrolling, artillery, etc. – but several were explicitly counterinsurgency or internal-security oriented. For example, SOA offered:
Intelligence and Counterintelligence: A “Combat Intelligence” course introduced students to battlefield intelligence, electronic warfare, and “internal defense and development” (i.e. domestic counterinsurgency) . Another course, titled “Counterintelligence,” taught surveillance, infiltration of “subversive” groups, and interrogation methods . Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): SOA ran an 8-week course on psychological operations (“softening” civilian attitudes, propaganda, information warfare) . This covered doctrine and planning of PSYOP campaigns, reflecting the U.S. Special Forces approach. (Senior SOA trainers later admitted that manuals on “psychological warfare” were taught in the 1980s). Interrogation and Repressive Tactics: Most controversially, SOA taught techniques that critics saw as torture and coercion. The Army’s Spanish-language manual “Interrogación” (Interrogation) was issued to SOA classrooms in the 1980s . SOA course materials included guidance on “handling” sources, planting spies, and using threats. A Pentagon inquiry in 1996 declassified hundreds of pages of SOA manuals. One NGO summary noted: “throughout the 1,169 pages of the manuals there are few mentions of democracy or human rights. Instead, they provide detailed techniques for infiltrating social movements, interrogating suspects, [and] controlling the population” . Special Forces and Counterterrorism: SOA also offered courses in urban guerrilla warfare (e.g. “Terrorism and Urban Guerrilla” manual), jungle operations, and even preparing officers to fight drug traffickers (“Counterdrug Operations” became a top priority by the 1990s ). “Internal Defense” Doctrine: A recurring theme was that Latin American militaries should view all internal dissent as potential threats. SOA courses on “Internal Defense” and civil affairs trained officers to mobilize civilians against insurgents. Military manuals explicitly taught that poverty activists, union leaders or clergy could be “enemies of the state” if labeled Communist. As SOA Watch activists summarized, “the majority of SOA soldiers attend classes focusing on combat training, commando tactics, psychological warfare, military intelligence” – “classes pertaining to military violence” .
In sum, SOA curricula combined conventional military training with Cold War counterinsurgency. Instructors instilled an ideology that conflated social reform with subversion, effectively encouraging graduates to quash dissent by any means. SOA thus functioned as a conduit of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine into Latin American armies. This often meant preparing officers to police their own societies and suppress what the military saw as “internal enemies.”
U.S. Strategic Context: Hemispheric Security and Counterrevolution
The SOA must be understood in the broader context of U.S. hemispheric strategy. After World War II, the United States was determined to keep Latin America firmly anti-Communist. Early Cold War policies (Monroe Doctrine, Truman DoctrineTruman Doctrine Full Description:The Truman Doctrine established the ideological framework for the Cold War. It articulated a binary worldview, dividing the globe into two alternative ways of life: one based on the will of the majority (the West) and one based on the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority (Communism). This doctrine justified US intervention in conflicts far from its own borders, arguing that a threat to peace anywhere was a threat to the security of the United States. Critical Perspective:Critically, this doctrine provided the moral cover for aggressive expansionism. By framing complex local struggles—often involving anti-colonial or nationalist movements—strictly as battles between freedom and totalitarianism, it allowed the US to support authoritarian regimes and crush popular uprisings simply by labeling the opposition as “communist.”) morphed into the 1961 Alliance for Progress under Kennedy: a mix of aid for development and military support for friendly regimes . In practice, when land reform or leftist movements emerged, the Pentagon’s “internal war” logic prevailed. As one U.S. Army general put it in 1968, American planners sought to “coordinate the employment of internal security forces within and among Latin American countries… by assisting in the organization of integrated command and control centers [and] joint training exercises” . The School of the Americas, along with pan-hemispheric institutions like the Inter-American Defense Board, was a key part of this architecture.
During the 1960s–80s, U.S. policy openly favored military solutions to ideological conflict. In Vietnam the U.S. preached counterinsurgency; in Latin America the same doctrines were exported. Scholar Greg Grandin notes that under Reagan “U.S. allies in Central America killed over 300,000 people, tortured hundreds of thousands, and drove millions into exile” – often using U.S. training manuals on psychological torture . In Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, U.S. military aid and training supported authoritarian juntas aligned with Washington.
Thus the SOA served U.S. hemispheric strategy by building pro-American militaries. The U.S. government publicly portrayed the SOA as an instrument of stability and cooperation. In 1987 Congress even enacted legislation to continue SOA funding as part of security assistance programs. In the 1990s officials defended the School as a source of “democratic values” training. For example, in 1998 Defense Secretary William Cohen wrote Congress that the SOA was “an integral part of our efforts to develop closer and more effective ties to the militaries of Latin America,” insisting the School “transmits our values” to regional officers . Yet critics retorted that such claims rang hollow given the documented abuses by graduates: Representative Joseph Kennedy II quipped in 1998, “I don’t think a few human rights courses will make a difference…The people the school attracts are not there to learn human rights. They come to learn how to kill people more efficiently” .
SOA and Repression in Latin America
The human cost of SOA-trained forces was enormous across Latin America. In Chile and Argentina, military regimes used SOA-indoctrinated tactics in their “dirty wars.” During Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973–90), Chile’s security forces murdered or disappeared thousands (trade unionists, political activists, even opponents in exile). Many mid-level Chilean officers in the 1973 coup had attended SOA counterinsurgency courses. In Argentina’s 1976–83 “National Reorganization” regime, a junta of generals (Videla, Viola, Galtieri, Massera, etc.) oversaw death flights and torture of an estimated 30,000 “desaparecidosDesaparecidos Full Description: Victims of state terrorism who were secretly abducted, detained, and murdered without legal process or public record. The state denied all knowledge of their whereabouts, trapping families in a permanent state of anguish and uncertainty.Desaparecidos refers to a specific technique of repression where the state erases the existence of its victims. People were snatched from their homes or streets, taken to clandestine detention centers, tortured, and then secretly disposed of (often thrown from aircraft into the ocean). By refusing to acknowledge the arrest or the body, the regime stripped the victim of all legal rights and humanity. Critical Perspective:Disappearance is a form of psychological warfare against the community. It denies the families the right to grieve and creates a pervasive atmosphere of terror where anyone could vanish without a trace. It allows the state to maintain “plausible deniability” regarding its crimes while simultaneously signaling its absolute power over life and death..” All of those top officers had received U.S. training at various U.S. schools, including SOA. In each case, the language of National Security Doctrine – treating internal dissent as war – underpinned state terror.
In El Salvador, the U.S.-backed government and its death squads (led by SOA alumni like D’Aubuisson) waged a civil war in the 1980s. Villages were razed and clergy targeted under doctrines learned at SOA. In Guatemala, decades of counterinsurgency under Ríos Montt and successors also resembled an internal war: entire Mayan communities were massacred as guerrilla collaborators. SOA graduates were often in command. Throughout Central America, SOA graduates formed much of the officer corps that used scorched-earth tactics. In Panama, Noriega and his officers similarly repressed opposition under U.S.-trained methods until the 1989 U.S. invasion ousted him.
A vivid example is the 1989 Jesuit Martyrs Massacre in El Salvador. Among the six assassins, GAO reports and activists note, several had studied at the SOA. This pattern – where SOA-trained soldiers turn up at notorious killings – has been repeatedly documented. In fact, SOA Watch tallied that of the five Salvadoran paratroopers who killed the four American churchwomen in 1980, three were SOA graduates . Archbishop Romero’s assassins included two SOA alumni, and 1980s death-squad architects in Guatemala and Honduras likewise had SOA credentials. Even regimes not directly on the SOA roster benefitted: for instance, Venezuela’s coup leaders (Venezuelan army officers trained in the U.S.) invoked similar doctrines.
Operation Condor and U.S. Intervention
The School of the Americas also helped lay the groundwork for Operation Condor (1975–83), the Southern Cone’s transnational terror network. Declassified CIA files (cited by historians) show that in the late 1960s-70s U.S. planners at SOA and Western Hemisphere defense forums coordinated with Latin American militaries to “deal with perceived threats” . One memo notes that in early 1974, Argentine, Chilean, Uruguayan, Paraguayan and Bolivian security officials met in Buenos Aires to plan “coordinated actions against subversive targets” . Condor operations (including assassinations of exiles in Europe and the Americas) were thus a joint venture by U.S.-armed dictatorships. Scholars like McSherry argue that “Operation Condor was a cooperative mission enabled by Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, [Bolivia]…” with U.S. support . The SOA’s role was to professionalize the militaries engaged in Condor: officers learned techniques for intelligence-sharing and repression at the School, then applied them back home. Condor’s bloody legacy (an estimated thousands of disappeared) is inseparable from the broader Cold War mission that schools like SOA served.
U.S. Policy and Justifications
Throughout the SOA’s existence, U.S. officials offered public justifications rooted in strategic necessity. They portrayed the school as a benign training center in Latin America. In 1987, for example, a Congressional briefing noted SOA’s “long-term investment in a positive relationship” with Latin American armies . After scandals erupted, the Pentagon repeatedly emphasized that SOA included human rights training. In 1998, Captain Kevin McIver (the school’s spokesman) claimed the SOA had begun teaching human rights decades prior, and after criticism had “beefed up” this instruction . Defense Secretary Cohen assured Congress the training was now “in accordance with U.S. law” and that SOA graduates would carry U.S. “values” back home .
However, critics pointed out these claims rang hollow. In 1996 the Pentagon quietly recovered or destroyed copies of the interrogation manuals and insisted they did not reflect U.S. policy. But the damage was done: dozens of Congressmembers called for SOA’s closure. Representative Kennedy summed up the opposition: “Once again the U.S. is shamed” when a new mass atrocity emerges in Latin America and SOA alumni are involved . Even some allies expressed reservations; by the 2000s several Latin American governments (e.g. Venezuela, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia) announced they would no longer send officers to the SOA , citing its tainted record.
Ultimately, Congress and the administration opted for reform rather than abolition. The 2001 National Defense Authorization Act closed the School of the Americas “as such” and authorized a new Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). The law explicitly required WHINSEC to operate “within the democratic principles set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States” . Supporters argued the name-change and curriculum tweaks would address past problems. But opponents charged it was merely rebranding. As SOA Watch noted, WHINSEC retained the same instructors, courses, and objectives . Even in 2023 critics still deride it as the “School of Assassins,” pointing out that a base renaming (to Fort Moore) cannot erase decades of history .
Historiographical Debates
Scholarship on the SOA has evolved. Early critics like Lesley Gill (2004) documented SOA’s role in political violence across Latin America. Gill argues that SOA was not merely a language school but a key node in U.S.-backed repression: “the School’s graduates in torture, murder and political repression [are] so widely documented” that the school’s role cannot be ignored . She traced how graduates in Chile, Argentina, Central America and elsewhere implemented the Pentagon’s counterinsurgency model. For example, Gill observes that many of the coup officers in Chile had passed through SOA (or related U.S. schools), and that SOA-corps taught “methods of assassination against compatriots” .
On the other hand, revisionist scholarship questions how direct the SOA’s impact was. A recent military history study of Chile (“Allies, Partners, or Puppets?”) notes that some specialists believe SOA courses were chiefly technical training, not indoctrination. One American analyst quoted argues that by the 1960s the U.S. Army was mixing Latin officers into broad classes (with civilians, regular students, etc.), making overt political indoctrination unlikely . Chilean historians have pointed out that domestic politics (e.g. class conflicts, presidential elections) played large roles that U.S. training alone cannot explain. In short, debates continue over how central SOA was to Latin American repression. Scholars like Greg Grandin add broader perspective, noting that the SOA was part of a larger pattern of U.S.-supported authoritarianism: “U.S. allies in Central America…killed over 300,000 people… [and] were supplied…with instruction manuals in psychological torture” . Kate Doyle and the National Security Archive have compiled documentation on Guatemalan and Chilean dictatorship-era files, underscoring U.S. involvement. But some Cold War veterans argue that SOA training also helped prevent communist insurgencies and that the corruption lay in regimes’ misuse of that training. The historical record shows SOA as a contested symbol: to supporters a partnership school, to critics an instrument of imperialist counterinsurgency.
Closure, SOA Watch and WHINSEC
From the 1990s onward, a vibrant closure campaign coalesced around SOA Watch, an activist coalition started in 1990 by Father Roy Bourgeois and others. The movement grew out of outrage over the UCA Jesuit massacre in El Salvador: protesters pointed out that the killers had been SOA-trained . Each November hundreds (and later thousands) of activists marched at Fort Benning’s gates, calling the institution the “School of Assassins.” These protests drew widespread attention: by 1998 over 20,000 people participated in the annual vigil . SOA Watch also lobbied Congress. They highlighted the Pentagon’s own admission in 1996 that some SOA manuals advocated “torture, extortion and execution,” and that these had been issued to Latin students .
While closure never happened, SOA Watch did succeed in forcing change. In late 2000, under mounting pressure, President Clinton “suspended” the SOA for one month. In 2001 Congress passed a law converting it to WHINSEC . In practice this meant the same Fort Benning school continued operating under a new name with a few added courses on civilian control and human rights. Activists viewed it skeptically: as one SOA Watch statement put it, U.S. tax dollars still fund an institution “that perpetuates violence and bloodshed” . Indeed, in 2001 the Pentagon inspector general reported that WHINSEC’s curriculum remained largely unchanged from SOA’s, despite the new title.
In the two decades since, SOA/WHINSEC persists, though controversies remain. A few countries still send officers to the school, and it now recruits students from regions beyond Latin America (Central Asia, Middle East, etc.). Domestic oversight of graduates is still minimal, leading human rights groups to worry about “mission creep” (e.g. training some Arab and African forces). Meanwhile, critics note that tens of thousands of SOA/WHINSEC alumni hold high military posts in Latin America, continuing to shape security policies. The legacy of SOA’s “export of counterinsurgency” endures: many of the continent’s current militaries still bear its imprint – for better or worse – in their doctrine and organizational mindset.
Conclusion
From 1946 through the end of the Cold War, the School of the Americas was a linchpin of U.S. strategy to counter leftist movements in the Western Hemisphere. Its creation and relocation to Fort Benning reflected the geopolitical imperatives of 1940s–80s America. Its curriculum – rooted in National Security Doctrine – trained Latin American officers in counterinsurgency, intelligence, and psychological warfare. Case studies from Panama to Argentina show that many of the men who carried out brutal campaigns of repression had learned their skills at SOA. SOA’s role in Operation Condor and support for anti-Communist regimes underscores how deeply it was woven into U.S. hemispheric policy. U.S. officials defended the school as a partnership to foster professionalism and democratic values, but scholars and activists maintain that it operated as a “workshop” for counterrevolution, exporting methods of political violence back home .
Today the SOA lives on as WHINSEC at Fort Benning, nominally under new principles. However, history has not forgotten the school’s role. The extensive documentation compiled by researchers (Lesley Gill, Patrice McSherry, Greg Grandin, Kate Doyle and others) and by advocates (SOA Watch) makes clear that U.S. training exerted a powerful influence on domestic repression across Latin America. As one analyst observed, “A story comes out about violence or oppression in Latin America, and the names of School of the Americas graduates emerge” . The full record of SOA/WHINSEC – from 1946 to the present – remains a topic of heated debate and moral reckoning in both the United States and Latin America.
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